A  Voice  Out  of  Russia 


THE  treatment  accorded  Russia  by  her  sister 
nations  in  the  months  to  come  will  be  the 
acid  test  of  their  good  will,  of  their  com- 
prehension of  her  needs  as  distinguished  from  their 
own  interests,  and  of  their  intelligent  and  unselfish 
sympathy." 

"There  is,  morever,  a  voice  calling  for  these  defini- 
tions of  principle  and  of  purpose  which  is,  it  seems 
to  me,  more  thrilling  and  more  compelling  than  any 
of  the  many  moving  voices  with  which  the  troubled 
air  of  the  world  is  filled.  It  is  the  voice  of  the 
Russian  people.  They  are  prostrate  and  all  but 
helpless,  it  would  seem,  before  the  grim  power  of 
Germany,  which  has  hitherto  known  no  relenting 
and  no  pity.  Their  power,  apparently,  is  shattered. 
And  yet  their  soul  is  not  subservient.  They  will 
not  yield  either  in  principle  or  in  action.  Their 
conception  of  what  is  right,  of  what  it  is  humane 
and  honorable  for  them  to  accept,  has  been  stated 
with  a  frankness,  a  largeness  of  view,  a  generosity  of 
spirit,  and  a  universal  human  sympathy  which  must 
challenge  the  admiration  of  every  friend  of  man- 
kind; and  they  have  refused  to  compound  their 
ideals  or  desert  others  that  they  themselves  may  be 
safe." — President  Wilson  in  an  address  deliv- 
ered at  a  joint  session  of  the  two  houses  of 
Congress,  January  8,  1918. 


1.  WITHDRAW  FROM  RUSSIA! 

2.  SOVIET  RUSSIA  AND  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION 
By  Lincoln  Colcord 

3.  A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA 
By  George  V.  LomonossofF 

4.  DECREE  ON  LAND 

5.  DECREE  ON  WORKERS'  CONTROL 

i     PRICE      TE  iV  :  3C*J6,  iV  T^ 


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The  Dial  is  conducting  a  fundamental 
and  authoritative  discussion  of  the  princi- 
ples of  reconstruction.  It  is  publishing 
also  issue  by  issue,  the  blunt  truth  about 
Russia.  It  is  keenly  alert  to  all  significant 
events  which  help  interpret  the  funda- 
mental struggle  w^hich  the  war  has  laid 
bare  with  such  startling  clearness. 

The  Dial  appeals  to  those  who  are  eager 
for  the  truth  and  who  are  aware  that  the 
daily  press  is  not  presenting  the  truth  in 
an  adequate  or  unprejudiced  manner. 

pu\)\x%hedi  fortnightly 
ROBERT  MORSS  LOVETT,  Editor 


1 


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THE  RADICAL  BOCK  : 
867  No.  C\mx  St, 
CHICAGO,      •        -  '   ILLlNOiS 

Withdraw  from  Russia ! 

On  March  15,  1917,  the  news  of  the  abdication 
of  the  Czar  was  flashed  around  the  world.  Demo- 
cratic nations  rejoiced;  and  America,  itself  founded 
on  a  revolution,  sent  its  sympathy  and  greeting  to 
the  people  of  Russia  who  had  burst  through  the 
chains  of  centuries  of  black  oppression.  Less  than 
a  month  later  we  ourselves  entered  the  war  against 
Germany.  We  had  suffered  very  little  either  in 
property  loss  or  in  human  life ;  indeed  our  neutrality 
had  brought  us  prosperity.  Russia,  on  the  contrary, 
had  suffered  all  things:  betrayal  at  the  front,  unpre- 
cedented slaughter  of  her  soldiers,  disorganization, 
unemployment,  famine,  disease.  Her  army  was  go- 
ing to  pieces.  It  was  not  the  time  for  the  Allied 
nations  to  urge  her  to  continue  the  war  against 
Germany — a  war  which,  Bolsheviki  or  no  Bolshe- 
viki.  Constituent  Assembly  or  no  Constituent  As- 
sembly, counter-revolution  or  no  counter-revolution, 
it  was  physically  impossible  for  her  to  undertake. 
Yet  the  Allied  nations  did  urge  her,  and  as  a  result 
of  their  urging  the  disastrous  advance  into  Galicia 
was  begun.  It  ended  in  perhaps  the  greatest  retreat 
in  history.  And  new,  strange  voices  began  to  be 
heard  in  Russia,  voices  which  asked  President  Wil- 
son precisely  what  he  meant  by  his  phrase  a  world 
"safe  for  democracy,"  voices  which  challenged  the 
aims  of  the  Allies.  Russia,  these  voices  said,  wanted 
a  peace  with  ''no  annexations,  no  indemnities,  and 
the  right  of  all  peoples  to  determine  their  own 
destiny."  It  was  a  magic  phrase.  The  Allied  na- 
tions could  ignore  it  no  longer. 

We  cannot  give  in  detail  the  tragic  history  of  the 
summer  and  autumn  of  1917.  But  the  main  out- 
lines of  that  history,  as  far  as  Russia  is  concerned, 
are  clear.  Not  once,  but  again  and  again,  did  the 
Kerensky  Government  appeal  to  the  Allied  nations 
for  a  revision  of  war  aims.     Not  once,  but  again 


4         *  -    "      -.    WITHDRAW *FROM  RUSSIA 

and  again,  were  the  Russian  people  promised  that 
revision.  Yet  the  revision  was  never  made.  The 
secret  treaties  (known  about  all  over  Russia)  were 
never  repudiated.  And  inevitably  the  Bolsheviki 
came  into  power,  as  much  from  the  blundering  of 
the  Allied  nations  and  from  their  unwillingness  to 
subscribe  to  the  tenets  of  real  democratic  peace  as 
from  any  other  reason.  What  the  previous  govern- 
ments had  promised  to  the  Russian  people  and  never 
had  secured  the  Bolsheviki  did  secure.  The  previous 
governments  had  promised  publication  of  the  secret 
treaties,  division  of  the  land — and  peace.  They 
fulfilled  none  of  their  promises.  But  almost  the  first 
act  of  the  new  Bolshevik  Government  was  the  pub- 
lication of  the  secret  treaties.  The  decree  on  land, 
— dividing  the  estates  according  to  promise — 
[which  we  reprint  on  another  page  of  this  pamph- 
let], was  the  first  official  act  of  the  new  govern- 
ment, and  together  with  the  decree  on  peace 
made  great  political  capital  for  the  Bolshevik  Party. 
Although  Lenin  apologized  at  the  time  for  the 
haste  with  which  the  decree  on  land  was  brought 
out,  its  main  provisions  were  later  adopted  by  the 
All  Russian  Congress  of  the  Soviets.  Peace  with 
Germany  was  also  procured,  first  by  an  armistice 
and  finally  by  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  Brest- 
Litovsk  on  March  16,  1918 — ironically  enough 
within  one  day  of  one  year  after  the  beginning  of  the 
Revolution  itself. 

Following  the  Bolshevik  success,  what  the  whole 
course  of  events  and  policy  has  shown  is  that  for  the 
first  time  in  the  history  of  the  modern  world  we  are 
confronted  with  an  economic  revolution  instead  of 
a  merely  political  revolution.  The  Soviet  Govern- 
ment might  have  been  captured  by  any  one  of  the 
many  political  parties  of  Russia,  the  Mensheviki, 
the  Right  Social  Revolutionary  Party,  even  the  Left 
Communist  Party  (which  accuse  both  Lenin  and 
Trotzky  of  being  "reactionaries"!),  and  so  on.     It 


WITHDRAW  FROM  RUSSIA  D 

was  as  a  matter  of  fact  carried  by  the  Bolshevik 
Party,  which,  in  spite  of  reports  to  the  contrary, 
gained  in  strength  as  time  went  on  and  today,  after 
over  a  year  of  its  rule,  has  behind  it  the  majority 
support  of  the  Russian  people  and  can  actually  hope 
in  the  coming  spring  to  have  a  Red  Army  of  per- 
haps three  million  soldiers  ready  to  lay  down  their 
lives  in  its  defense.  Why?  What  is  the  vital 
principle  of  the  Bolsheviki  that  keeps  them  so  long 
in  power?  From  what  background  do  they  spring? 
What  do  they  want? 

Although  these  questions  deserve  detailed  answers, 
we  wish  to  state,  for  the  sake  of  clearness,  our 
belief  concerning  the  chief  points.  Russians  regard 
us,  as  well  as  many  others  in  Western  nations,  as 
political  infants.  They  are  not  content  with  what 
we  glibly  call  democracy.  Their  hopes  and  aspira- 
tions are  centered  on  a  greater  experiment  than 
merely  representative  government.  They  are  intense- 
ly communistic,  more  so  than  the  people  of  any  other 
country.  They  want  actually  to  abolish  the  whole 
institution  of  private  property.  They  want  to  create 
a  government  which  is  entirely  a  people's  govern- 
ment, a  government  of  the  workers  and  the  poor 
peasants.  They  will,  if  they  can,  abolish  the  capital- 
ist class.  Contrary  to  repo/t,  they  bear  no  ill  will 
against  the  intellectuals  as  a  class,  although  they 
recognize  the  basic  truth  of  the  psychology  of  the 
intellectual  class;  that  is,  they  regard  the  intellec- 
tuals as  parasites  on  the  so-called  capitalist 
class.  Yet  they  hold  the  professions  and  the 
arts  in  high  honor.  Their  program  for  universal 
education  is  extensive,  and  is  not  confined  to  merely 
vocational  training.  The  Soviet  Government  has 
encouraged  individual  artists,  subsidized  theaters 
and  the  ballet  and  the  opera.  It  has  reprinted  the 
great  classics  of  literature  in  inexpensive  form  for 
everybody.  It  recognizes  the  need  for  technical 
experts   and   for   discipline   of   all   kinds.      Funda- 


0  WITHDRAW  FROM  RUSSIA 

mentally,  however,  it  is  interested  in  maintaining  a 
workers'  government,  supported,  as  Lenin  so  elo- 
quently phrased  it  in  a  speech  before  the  Moscow 
Soviet,  by  ''the  regular  march  of  the  iron  battalions 
of  the  proletariat." 

One  point  more,  perhaps,  needs  emphasis.  The 
universality  of  the  stories  in  the  daily  press  about 
the  "Red  Terror"  and  the  mass  murder  of  the  bour- 
geois class  demands  corrective.  In  the  first  place, 
there  was  no  "Red  Terror"  before  the  invasion  of 
Russia  by  Allied  troops.  In  the  second  place,  the 
executions  are  not  irresponsible  murders,  but  de- 
liberate measures  of  self-defense,  such  as  any  govern- 
ment in  similar  circumstances,  threatened  both  by 
internal  and  external  enemies,  invariably  adopts. 
In  the  third  place,  the  number  of  them  has  been 
grossly  exaggerated.  In  the  fourth  place,  they  do 
not  begin  to  equal  the  indiscriminate  slaughter  of 
Soviet  officials  practiced  by  the  invading  troops 
(principally  the  Czecho-Slovaks)  whenever  they  are 
successful  in  overthrowing  a  local  Soviet.  In  the 
fifth  place,  plots  against  the  Central  Soviet  Govern- 
ment have  been  persistent  and  unscrupulous,  both 
on  the  part  of  the  disgruntled  Russians  who  have 
been  expropriated  or  who  have  a  political  axe  to 
grind  and  on  the  part  of*  foreign  governments,  de- 
sirous of  the  overthrow  of  the  present  regime.  In 
a  word,  the  Soviet  Government  has  adopted  the  con- 
ventionally harsh  method  of  suppressing  the  at- 
tempts to  instigate  civil  war  in  Russia.  Had  the 
Allied  Governments  recognized  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment instead  of  attacking  it,  and  had  they  given  it 
the  cooperation  and  assistance  which  it  asked,  it  is 
safe  to  assume  that  fully  nine-tenths  of  the  present 
"Red  Terror"  would  not  have  occurred.  Recently, 
moreover,  thanks  to  Allied  intervention,  the  Bolshe- 
viki  have  become  so  strong  in  their  internal  grip  on 
the  situation  that  they  are  now  in  a  sufficiently 
secure  position  not  to  need  to  employ  the  harsher 


WITHDRAW  FROM  RUSSIA  / 

measures  of  the  '*Red  Terror."  The  brain  worker 
and  the  petit  bourgeois  are  no  longer  to  be  op- 
pressed, but  propitiated.  The  further  the  armies  of 
the  Allied  Governments  march  into  Russia  the 
stronger  becomes  the  movement  towards  reconcilia- 
tion within  the  country.  It  is  an  ancient  phe- 
nomenon. Before  the  foreign  enemy  domestic  dif- 
ferences vanish — all  become  Russians.  Well  could 
Trotzky  state  that  he  could  have  afforded  to  pay 
one  hundred  thousand  roubles  for  every  Japanese  sol- 
dier landed  on  Russian  soil.  The  blundering  policy 
of  the  Allied  Governments  has  not  only  evoked  the 
Bolsheviki — if  continued,  it  will  make  all  Russia 
support  them. 

And  yet  this  mad  policy  has  been  followed  in 
spite  of  the  many  attempts  that  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment has  made  to  cooperate  with  the  Allied  Govern- 
ments. There  was  always  what  one  might  call  an 
undercurrent  of  flirtation  with  the  Allied  Govern- 
ments. For  us  there  was  open  friendship:  even  the 
more  fanatical  recognized  the  difference  between  a 
medieval  autocracy  like  Germany  and  a  liberal 
republic  like  ourselves.  Before  the  Brest-Litovsk 
treaty  Trotzky  requested  the  American  Army  to 
send  him  officers  to  instruct  the  Red  Army  and  to 
put  it  in  a  position  to  fight  Germany  again.  He 
requested  the  English  to  send  him  English  naval  offi- 
cers to  take  charge  of  the  Black  Sea  Fleet  in  order 
that  it  might  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Germans. 
He  even  accepted  the  proffered  help  of  a  few  French 
officers  then  in  Russia,  who,  according  to  reliable 
witnesses,  not  only  did  not  train  the  Red  Army,  but 
abused  the  confidence  given  them  to  get  information 
which  was  later  put  at  the  disposal  of  the  Czecho- 
slovak troops.  After  the  treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk 
was  signed  it  was  imperative,  of  course,  that  appear- 
ances should  be  kept  up  with  Germany.  Yet  the 
Soviet  Government's  appeal  to  the  Allies  for  co- 
operation was  constant.     During  February  they  re- 


\ 


8  WITHDRAW  FROM  RUSSIA  ' 

quested  an  American  railway  expert  to  take  charge 
of  the  technical  details  of  the  Russian  railroads,  and 
a  little  later  they  informally  proposed  to  give  us  the 
right  to  purchase  ore  and  other  raw  materials  (to 
purchase  it  exclusively,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  these 
were  just  the  things  needed  then  by  Germany)  in 
exchange  for  shipments  of  American  goods  to  Rus- 
sia. Liberal  exchanges  of  Russian  raw  materials  for 
food  were  guaranteed.  Time  after  time  the  Soviet 
Government  made  direct  and  indirect  offers  of  com- 
mercial cooperation.  And  usually  they  signified 
their  complete  willingness  to  renew  the  war  against 
Germany  (for  they  never  hesitated  to  describe  the 
treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  as  no  other  than  a  robber's 
peace)  as  soon  as  the  army  could  be  reorganized 
and  supplied  with  necessary  munitions  and  equip- 
ment. Not  one  of  these  many  offers  was  acknowl- 
edged, much  less  accepted.  There  seemed  to  be  a 
preconcerted  plan  not  to  recognize  the  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment under  any  circumstances  and  no  matter 
what  they  offered.  Since  the  armistice  with  Ger- 
many they  have  themselves  offered  an  armistice  to  the 
Allied  nations.  More :  according  to  the  Daily  News 
of  London,  Litvinoff,  the  representative  until  re- 
cently of  the  Soviet  Government  in  England,  has 
formally  offered  any  concessions  ,to  the  Allied  na- 
tions— including  payment  on  the  national  debt  by 
what  gold  is  in  Russia  and  by  liberal  concessions — in 
return  for  recognition  of  the  Soviet  Government  by 
the  Allied  nations — and  peace.  But  so  far  the  con- 
sistently and  sincerely  friendly  advances  of  the  Soviet 
Government  have  been  ignored. 

Possibly  one  reason  for  this  has  been  the  star 
chamber  method  of  conducting  our  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Government.  If  public 
opinion  in  the  various  Allied  countries — ourselves 
included — had  ever  had  any  opportunity  whatever 
to  discuss  any  of  these  offers,  the  situation  today 
might  be  different.    But  the  news  from  Russia,  par- 


WITHDRAW  FROM  RUSSIA  9 

ticularly  since  the  Bolsheviki  have  had  control,  has 
been  notoriously  false.  The  stories  of  massacre  and 
anarchy  are,  of  course,  largely  for  effect,  and  are 
not  to  be  taken  seriously.  It  is  also  well  known  that 
various  governmental  censorships,  principally  the 
British,  have  suppressed  actual  news  messages 
sent  by  accredited  correspondents  of  accredited 
news  associations  from  Moscow  and  Petrograd 
— messages  sent  by  men  who  w^ere  not  them- 
selves Bolsheviki  at  all,  but  simply  honest  journal- 
ists. And  many  are  the  stories  of  events  by  "eye- 
witnesses" who  saw  no  more  than  the  inside  of  a 
hotel  in  Stockholm.^  Not  a  word  of  the  constructive 
work  being  done  by  the  Soviet  Government  has 
been  given  out  by  the  press.  Such  simple  docu- 
ments as  we  publish  on  another  page,  for  example, 
are  practically  unknown.  All  that  we  are  allowed 
are  silly  stories  about  new  decrees  on  marriage  and 
free  love,  issued  (where  rarely  authentic)  by  irre- 
sponsible groups  striving  to  put  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment in  a  false  light.  When  a  really  first-rate 
analysis  of  what  the  Soviet  Government  is  doing 
is  published — like  The  Soviets  at  Work  by  Lenin — 
we  are  informed  by  Postmaster  General  Burleson 
that  it  is  unmailable.  But  the  worst  of  all  is  the 
fashion  in  which  the  news  about  Allied  intervention 
is  distorted.  We  are  led  to  believe  that  Allied  troops 
landed  in  Vladivostok  to  restore  "law  and  order," 
to  put  down  the  rule  of  an  anarchical  minority  and 
to  substitute  a  democratic  government.  It  is  false. 
There  was  quiet  and  the  best  of  law  and  order  at 
Vladivostok  when  Allied  troops  landed.  The  Soviet 
had  the  support  and  affection  of  the  people.  The 
Allied  troops  did  not  set  up  a  democratic  govern- 
ment: they  set  up  a  reactionary  dictatorship.  We 
are  prepared  to  prove  that  in  every  case  where 
Allied  troops  have  invaded  Russian  soil  they  have 
overthrown  the  popular  government  and  set  up  a 
temporary   government   resting   for   its  support  on 


10  WITHDRAW  FROM  RUSSIA 

foreign  bayonets,  a  government  reactionary  and  in 
some  cases  even  frankly  monarchist.  It  is  safe  to 
say  that  the  average  American  citizen  would  be 
thoroughly  shocked  at  knowing  the  kind  of  imperial- 
istic and  anti-democratic  game  which  is  being  played 
by  our  own  and  our  Allies'  armies  in  Russia.  These 
are  facts  and  we  think  it  high  time  that  they  be  told. 
We  do  not  believe  that  our  own  Government  wants 
the  restoration  of  the  monarchy  in  Russia  or  that  it 
would  support  a  demonstrably  unpopular  govern- 
ment forever.  The  American  Government  would 
like  to  see  in  Russia  a  liberal  and  commercial  re- 
public like  ourselves — a  quiet,  respectable  govern- 
ment with  which  we  could  do  business.  Undoubt- 
edly. But  what  we  should  like  and  what  we  are  as 
a  matter  of  cold  fact  getting  are  two  widely  different 
things.  It  is  no  secret  that  powerful  parties  in  Japan 
are  advocating  the  unostentatious  annexation  of  large 
sections  of  Siberia,  and  that  they  have  no  interest  in 
seeing  any  stable  popular  government  arise  east  of 
the  Urals.  It  is  no  secret  that  England  trembles  for 
Persia,  Afghanistan,  and  India,  and  that  the  Tory 
party  would  gladly  crush  the  Russian  Revolution  if 
it  exhibited  any  tendency  towards  proselytism  in  for- 
eign countries  (as  it  has).  It  is  no  secret  that  a  cer- 
tain section  of  French  governmental  opinion  cares 
not  a  fig  what  sort  of  a  reactionary  government  there 
is  in  Russia,  provided  only  it  is  a  government  that 
will  immediately  repay  the  foreign  loan.  In  a  word, 
our  intervention  in  Russia  may  have  been  undertaken 
with  the  best  of  intentions,  but  the  practical  situation 
with  which  we  are  faced  today  is  either  to  support 
reaction  and  imperialis?n  or — to  withdraw  our 
troops,  Russian  intervention  has  become  for  Amer- 
ica a  tragic  anachronism  since  the  defeat  of  Ger- 
many. We  have  neither  a  national  nor  an  interna- 
tional interest  which  today  legitimately  sanctions  the 
presence  of  our  troops  on  Russian  soil.  It  is  false 
to   our   traditions   to   be    fighting   a   workingman's 


WITHDRAW  FROM  RUSSIA  1 1 

republic,  even  if  we  do  not  approve  of  its  form  or  its 
manners.  It  is  not  in  accordance  with  any  doctrine 
of  American  national  policy  for  us  to  be  engaged 
in  crushing  a  revolution  or  in  crucifying  the  hopes 
and  aspirations  of  a  great  and  mighty  people.  It 
is  really  difficult  to  believe  that  this  is  the  same 
country  which  in  Washington's  time  almost  had  a 
civil  war  because  this  government  refused  to  inter- 
vene in  the  French  Revolution,  on  behalf  of  the 
revolutionists.  And  not  even  the  most  severe  critics 
of  the  present  leaders  of  the  Soviet  Government  have 
said  one-tenth  as  bitter  things  as  were  said  of 
Robespierre  and  Marat  in  their  day.  No;  to  help 
crush  a  revolution  is  not  in  accordance  with  the 
real  American  tradition. 

For  that  reason  we  demand  of  our  Govern- 
ment that  our  troops  now  in  Russia  be  immedi- 
ately withdrawn.  We  are  asking  no  more  than 
British  Labor  and  French  Labor  and  Italian  Labor 
have  already  officially  demanded  of  their  govern- 
ments. We  are  asking  no  more  than  President 
Wilson  has  again  and  again  promised  to  the  Russian 
people — "We  are  fighting,"  said  the  President  in 
his  communication  to  the  Provisional  Government 
of  Russia  on  June  9,  1917,  "for  the  liberty,  the 
self-government,  and  the  undictated  development  of 
all  peoples,  and  every  feature  of  the  settlement  that 
concludes  this  war  must  be  conceived  and  executed 
for  that  purpose."  We  are  asking  no  more  than 
would  ask,  if  they  knew  the  facts,  and  do  ask,  those 
who  are  aware  of  them,  the  soldiers  who  entered  this 
war  inspired  by  an  honest  ideal  to  defeat  the  menace 
of  German  autocracy  and  to  bring  freedom  to  the 
oppressed  peoples  of  the  world.  Those  who  have 
given  their  lives  on  the  battlefields  of  France  will 
rise  to  reproach  us  if  we  are  now  false  to  our  trust. 
We  have  fought  for  freedom,  and  as  the  President 
has  said,  the  undictated  development  of  all  peoples. 
We  demand  that  Russia  have  her  fair  chance  at  that 


12  WITHDRAW  FROM  RUSSIA 

freedom  and  self-development,  and  that  if  we  are  in 
no  position  to  direct  or  guide  the  actions  of  other 
nations  with  respect  to  her  we  at  least  shall  leave  her 
free  to  work  out  her  own  destiny.  Let  a  war  which 
has  not  been  declared  b}^  the  nation  we  are  fighting, 
or  by  ourselves,  cease.  And  let  those  representatives 
of  Russia  who  speak  for  the  majority  of  the  Rus- 
sian people  and  not  for  interested  cliques  of  in- 
triguers have  a  voice  and  a  hearing  at  the  peace 
conference. 

We  demand  that  freedom  of  communication  with 
Russia  be  at  once  restored,  and  that  the  whole  truth 
be  permitted  to  appear  without  let  or  hindrance  in 
our  periodicals;  that  the  motives  back  of  interven- 
tion, be  they  either  political  or  economic  or  what 
not,  be  given  to  the  American  people  in  order  that 
they  may  have  full  knowledge  and  may  of  them- 
selves determine  whether  or  not  they  are  willing  to 
back  up  the  present  intervention  in  Russia  and  what 
is  the  logical  further  activity  implied  by  that  inter- 
vention. We  demand  that  the  open  diplomacy  for 
which  the  President  has  declared  be  practiced  with 
respect  to  Russia.  We  demand,  in  a  single  word, 
the  truth.  We  have  lived  for  the  last  year  in  a 
poisonous  atmosphere  of  lies  and  slander  and  in- 
trigue and  double-dealing.  As  Americans,  who 
honestly  believe  that  we  speak  for  the  sober  second 
thought  of  this  country  and  for  those  who  have  no 
organ  of  publicity  or  appeal,  we  demand  that  once 
and  for  all  the  clean  wind  of  the  truth  be  allowed 
to  sweep  away  the  false  conceptions  and  interested 
propaganda  which  have  infected  the  country.  We 
demand  of  our  Government  a  clear  formulation  and 
simple,  honest  statement  of  its  Russian  policy.  We 
demand  that  that  policy  be  based  on  the  facts  and 
not  on  lies,  that  that  policy  be  American  and  Ameri- 
can alone. 

The  Editors. 


Soviet  Russia  and  the  American 
Revolution 

The  drawing  of  historic  analogies  is  a  perilous 
undertaking.  On  the  score  of  specific  incident  and 
detail  it  would  be  difficult  to  establish  the  case  for  a 
comparison  between  the  Russian  and  the  American 
Revolutions;  the  two  manifestations  apparently  run 
in  quite  independent  channels;  and  it  may  seem 
strange  that  anj^one  should  attempt  to  draw  a  paral- 
lel between  Russia  and  America  in  this  regard 
when  the  French  Revolution  superficially  offers  the 
better  analogy.  But  it  is  only  superficially;  after 
all  the  specific  objections  have  been  freely  admitted, 
after  all  detailed  criticism  has  been  allowed  to 
triumph  by  default  of  the  argument,  there  remains 
a  certain  divine  sense  in  which  the  Russian  Revolu- 
tion parallels  the  revolt  of  the  thirteen  American 
Colonies  more  nearly  than  the  other,  and  in  which 
the  proletariat  of  Russia  is  striving  to  accomplish 
for  his  w^orld  much  the  same  ideals  which  our  fore- 
fathers laid  down  for  theirs.  There  was  more  of  the 
spirit  of  the  people,  more  of  faith  and  dependence  in 
the  proletariat,  in  American  Revolutionary  doctrine 
than  we  seem  disposed  to  admit  today;  and  by  the 
same  token,  it  is  because  we  have  lost  our  sense  of 
fundamental  democracy  that  we  do  not  care  to  admit 
it.  But  we  should  think  too  highly  of  the  outright 
American  ideals  to  permit  them  without  protest  to 
be  swallowed  whole  by  the  pseudo-democratic  claims 
of  a  crass  plutocracy.  Totally  different  in  form  and 
substance,  in  method  and  event,  in  time,  place,  cir- 
cumstance, and  era,  these  two  revolutionary  mani- 
festations nevertheless  have  shown  the  same  spirit 
and  have  sprung  from  the  same  set  of  universal 
human  impulses.  To  their  respective  centuries  they 
have  meant  the  same  thing. 

In  fact,  has  not  the  thought  arrested  liberals 
everywhere  that  in  the  Soviet  system  we  see  a  fore- 


14  SOVIET  RUSSIA 

shadowing  jof  the  next  step  forward  in  the  machinery 
of  democratic  government,  bringing  our  present 
machiner}^  a  heritage  from  a  past  era,  abreast  of  the 
new  industrialized  world?  The  writers  of  the 
American  Constitution  certainly  strove  to  construct 
an  instrument  by  virtue  of  which  the  actual  majority 
of  the  electorate  should  control  the  government. 
They  certainly  strove  to  render  impossible  the  domi- 
nation of  a  ruling  class,  to  do  away  with  the  artificial 
complexities  of  politics,  and  to  bring  every  function 
of  government  within  the  grasp  and  comprehension 
of  the  whole  electorate.  Indeed,  they  went  much 
farther  than  this  in  theory,  and  by  opening  the  high- 
est office  to  the  lowest  citizen  they  faced  and 
acknowledged  the  truth  that  an  experience  in  human 
mutuality  may  be  a  better  equipment  for  the  art  of 
governing  than  education  or  a  cosmopolitan  training. 
In  a  day  of  simple  industrial,  social,  and  commercial 
elements,  class  lines  and  feelings  as  they  now  exist 
were  not  included  in  the  category.  But  these  have 
grown  up  rapidly  under  the  impetus  of  industrial- 
ism; and  along  with  them  have  grown,  in  new 
guise  but  in  the  same  unmistakable  form,  many  of 
the  very  political  and  governmental  evils  which 
the  writers  of  the  American  Constitution  strove  so 
hard  to  avoid.  Governments  have  become  complex 
once  more,  legislatures  have  passed  into  the  control 
of  lawyers,  the  body  of  the  electorate  does  not  see 
and  feels  that  it  cannot  grasp  what  is  going  on,  and 
a  ruling  class  selected  along  financial  attributes 
definitely  dominates  the  political  machinery  of  West- 
ern democracy.  In  a  word,  our  system  of  repre- 
sentative government  has  demonstrated,  to  the  class, 
at  least,  which  feels  the  grievance,  that  under 
changed  economic  conditions  it  does  not  fairly  repre- 
sent the  popular  will.  Allowing  for  the  great 
natural  difference  between  the  two  periods,  it  is  not 
stretching  the  point  to  say  that  the  Soviet  system  in 
Russia  proposes  to  do  for  the  new  era  something 


SOVIET  RUSSIA  15 

very  similar  in  its  political  objectives  to  that  which 
the  writers  of  the  American  Constitution  proposed 
to  do  for  the  old;  and  that  the  true  purpose  of 
Soviet  Russia,  irrespective  of  its  transitory  class 
dogma,  is  to  simplify  government  again  and  to 
bring  it  under  the  control  of  the" actual  majority. 

And  the  great  danger  which  besets  us  is  that,  in 
the  confusion  of  issues  and  events,  the  true  demo- 
cratic fundamentals  of  Russia  may  not  be  recognized 
in  time  by  American  and  Allied  statesmanship,  and 
that  the  natural  development  of  the  Russian  de- 
mocracy may  be  hopelessly  compromised  by  inter- 
ference from  abroad.  This,  in  turn,  would  quickly 
undermine  what  democracy  is  left  to  us  in  the  West, 
and  might  too  easily  bring  about  the  cataclysm.  The 
future  of  civilization  seems  to  hang  between  tlie 
devil  of  selfish  privilege  and  the  deep  sea  of  an 
inadequate  statesmanship.  From  the  beginning  of 
the  Revolution  Russia  has  relentlessly  precipitated 
for  the  democratic  world  the  issue  which  could  not 
be  put  aside. 

It  is  certain  that  Russia  cannot  continue  per- 
manently to  be  governed  on  a  class  basis.  The  logic 
of  life  and  history  precludes  such  an  outcome.  All 
the  tendencies  of  human  relationships  stand  un- 
alterably opposed  to  it.  The  outright  class  program 
of  Soviet  Russia,  which  already  shows  distinct  signs 
of  becoming  modified  under  the  pressure  of  events 
and  responsibilities,  is  bound  to  be  still  farther  modi- 
fied, until  it  loses  its  strictly  class  character.  The 
existing  bourgeoisie  may  easily  be  disposed  of,  but 
there  is  no  provision  in  the  class  program  for  the 
new  bourgeoisie  which  inevitably  will  be  developed 
out  of  the  body  of  the  proletariat.  The  various 
political  parties  of  Russia,  at  present  representing 
highly  antagonistic  class  groups,  must  ultimately 
come  together  in  some  workable  form  of  constitu- 
tional and  parliamentary  coalition.    The  furthering 


16  •  SOVIET  RUSSIA 

of  this  process  should  be  the  great  task  confronting 
American  and  Allied  statesmanship  today. 

Briefly,  the  political  issue  in  Russia  lies  between 
two  systems  of  governmental  authority  based  on 
different  principles  of  election  and  representation: 
the  Soviet  system,'  based  on  class  units;  and  the 
system  of  the  Constituent  Assembly,  based  on  the 
old  geographical  units.  The  Soviet  system  breaks  up 
the  old  geographical  election  district  into  class  units, 
each  one  of  which  elects  its  own  delegate  to  the  local 
Soviet;  and  the  local  Soviet,  in  turn,  elects  its  dele- 
gates to  the  next  higher  body.  This,  roughly,  is  the 
central  principle  of  an  extensive  governmental  sys- 
tem the  details  of  which  do  not  properly  come  within 
the  range  of  the  present  article.  The  basis  of  the 
Constituent  Assembly,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  old 
geographical  election  district  established  under  the 
Czar's  regime  at  the  time  of  the  first  Duma.  This 
also  is  the  Zemstvo  election  district. 

The  Soviet  system  made  its  appearance  in  Russia 
coincident  with  the  first  Revolution  of  the  spring  of 
1917.  It  was  the  authority  of  the  Soviet  system, 
through  its  first  manifestation  in  the  Council  c: 
Soldiers'  and  Workers'  Delegates  in  Petrograd, 
which  brought  about  the  downfall  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government  a  few  weeks  after  the  Revolu- 
)tion.  Throughout  the  summer  of  1917,  under  the 
Coalition  Government  and  during-^  the  Kerensky 
regime,  the  Soviet  system  was  the  real  power  in 
Russia.  From  the  very  beginning  the  forces  repre- 
senting the  Constituent  Assembly  have  not  been  able 
to  stand  against  the  Soviet  authority,  although  many 
counter-revolutions  in  the  name  of  the  Constituent 
Assembly  have  been  supported  from  abroad.  All  the 
events  of  the  Revolution  prove  the  case.  The  author- 
ity of  the  Soviet  system  has  maintained  itself  in  the 
face  of  the  combined  hostility  of  the  world,  and  is 
stronger  today  than  it  was  six  months  ago. 


SOVIET  RUSSIA  17 

The  fact  is  that  the  Soviet  system  is  a  new  ma- 
chinery of  representative  government,  derived  from 
the  principle  of  class  representation,  and  in  the  case 
of  Russia  taking  its  roots  in  the  local  machinery  of 
the  ancient  village  Mir.  It  is  a  system  simple  and 
direct  enough  to  be  understood  by  the  peasants  and 
workingmen,  and  through  it  they  are  able  without 
handicap  to  exercise  their  traditional  training  in 
local  self-government  and  to  apply  it  to  the  broader 
field  of  national  politics.  There  is  nothing  un- 
democratic about  the  Soviet  system;  its  ideal  seems 
to  be  to  produce  a  government  actually  representa- 
tive of  the  proportional  groupings  of  modern  society. 
With  the  addition  of  the  class  feature,  it  is  nothing 
but  an  extension  of  our  own  town-meeting  principle. 
Let  us  have  class  caucuses  in  town-meeting,  and  we 
have  the  local  Soviet.  At  any  rate,  this  system  is  a 
natural  product  of  social  and  political  fundamentals 
in  Russia,  and  as  such  plainly  is  indispensable  to  the 
development  of  the  true  Russian  democracy. 

So  the  real  issue,  throughout  the  Revolution,  has 
been  between  two  antagonistic  systems  of  representa- 
tive government  rather  than  between  various  politi- 
cal parties.  On  the  one  hand  were  the  Bolsheviki 
and  certain  groups  of  the  Mensheviki  and  Social 
Revolutionaries,  who  steadfastly  supported  the  So- 
viet system.  On  the  other  hand  were  the  Cadets 
and  the  reactionary  fringe  of  the  center  parties,  who 
supported  the  system  of  the  Constituent  Assembly. 
These  latter  have  refused  to  cooperate  in  the  Soviet 
system,  and  have  insisted  that  democracy  for 
Russia  lies  only  in  a  return  to  the  authority  of 
the  Constituent  Assembly.  It  is  not  difficult  to 
see  the  reason  for  this:  under  the  Soviet  sys- 
tem they  would  be  an  insignificant  minority, 
while  under  the  system  of  the  Constituent  Assembly 
they  would  stand  a  better  chance  of  controlling  the 
political  situation.  They  accuse  the  Soviet  authority 
of  overthrowing  the  Constituent  Assembly,  which  of 


18  SOVIET  RUSSIA 

course  was  done ;  but  the  Soviets  could  not  have  done 
it  and  maintained  the  position  without  the  backing 
of  a  majority  opinion.  Two  different  principles  of 
government  could  not  establish  their  separate  ma- 
chinery throughout  the  same  area.  In  the  clash  of 
Revolutionary  forces  the  Soviet  principle  won  the 
day,  and  became  established  as  the  will  of  the  Rus- 
sian people.  The  statement  that  the  peasants  are 
being  held  in  political  bondage  by  the  Soviets  does 
not  seem  to  be  borne  out  by  the  facts  of  the  case. 
The  Soviet  system  is  founded  on  peasant  funda- 
mentals, and  satisfies  peasant  training  and  psychol- 
ogy. It  cannot  be  overlooked  that  the  peasants  have 
not  yet  attempted  to  overthrow  the  Soviet  system, 
but  that  on  the  contrary  they  have  everywhere  sup- 
ported it;  and  that  nowhere  in  Russia  since  the  first 
Revolution  has  there  appeared  a  peasant  movement 
for  the  reestablishment  of  the  Constituent  Assembly. 
The  task  for  constructive  statesmanship,  therefore, 
obviously  is  to  effect  a  reconciliation  of  all  the  Revo- 
lutionary parties  of  Russia  based  on  the  Soviet  prin- 
ciple. It  is  now  fairly  demonstrable  that  to  attempt 
a  reconciliation  based  on  the  opposite  principle  is  to 
invite  ultimate  failure.  It  is  to  attempt  to  sustain 
the  small  minority  against  the  vast  majority,  to  set 
up  in  Russia  a  fictitious  authority  not  supported  by 
the  Russian  people.  This  has  been  tried  in  lending 
support  to  the  various  Counter-Revolutionary  move- 
ments, and  now  it  is  being  tried  directly  by  the  force 
of  Allied  and  American  arms.  Such  a  fictitious 
government  would  needs  be  supported  continuously 
by  military  power  from  abroad.  Who  will  promise 
that  such  a  policy  will  not  destroy  the  very  authority 
which  institutes  it,  through  the  revolt  of  the  pro- 
letariat ever5rwhere  ?  Who  will  deny  that  such  a 
policy  makes  utter  mockery  of  the  principle  of  self- 
determination,  for  which  the  democratic  world  os- 
tensibly has  been  fighting? 


SOVIET  RUSSIA  19 

The  second  necessary  office  of  American  and 
Allied  statesmanship  should  be  to  assist  in  bringing 
about  cohesion  within  the  Soviet  system  itself.  This 
system  has  sprung  up  like  a  mushroom  growth 
throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  Russia.  It  is 
natural  and  substantial  on  the  legislative  side,  but  it 
unavoidably  lacks  administrative  leadership  and  fed- 
eral cohesion.  The  executive  branch  suffers  from 
sheer  inadequacy  of  personnel:  A  legislative  system 
based  on  sound  fundamentals  creates  itself  auto- 
matically out  of  the  body  and  initiative  of  a  self- 
governing  people ;  but  a  corresponding  executive  sys- 
tem, with  its  enormous  problems  of  personnel  and 
authority,  has  to  be  built  up  more  slowly  out  of 
training,  education,  and  experience.  The  very  train- 
ing in  local  self-government  throughout  Russia 
which  gives  strength  to  the  legislative  function  of 
the  Soviet  system  militates  at  the  start  against  its 
administrative  cohesion;  the  provincial  Soviets  in 
some  cases  refuse  to  abide  by  the  decisions  of  the 
All-Russian  Congress,  and  in  general  the  local  So- 
viets, born  of  independence  and  intoxicated  by  a  year 
of  youthful  authority,  tend  to  go  their  own  ways. 
The  vastness  of  the  country,  the  educational  back- 
wardness of  the  people,  the  lack  of  transportation 
and  communication,  and  the  inevitable  provincialism 
of  the  whole  regime,  all  aggravate  this  failure  in 
administrative  cohesion.  In  addition,  a  great  deal 
of  the  trained  administrative  talent  of  Russia,  with 
vision  blurred  by  the  injustices  of  the  Revolutionary 
manifestation,  has  chosen  actively  to  conspire  against 
the  success  of  the  true  democratic  principle.  As  a 
result  of  all  this  we  see  a  movement  in  Russia  which 
superficially  may  look  like  a  disagreement  among 
the  Soviets  and  a  gradual  breaking  up  of  the  system 
itself,  but  which  in  reality  is  only  a  natural  stage  in 
the  very  unequal  and  desperately  difficult  develop- 
ment of  a  Russian  federation  based  on  true  demo- 
cratic fundamentals. 


20  SOVIET  RUSSIA 

Here  again  we  discover  that  vague  but  neverthe- 
less sound  analogy  between  the  Russian  and  the 
American  Revolutions.  In  both  cases  the  general 
problem  is  one  of  federation.  Russia,  like  America, 
has  found  her  true  legislative  fundamentals  but 
lacks  administrative  cohesion.  Russia,  like  America, 
has  her  small  body  of  Tories,  whose  property  is  be- 
ing confiscated,  whose  political  principles  are  being 
outraged,  and  who  are  betraying  her  at  every  turn. 
In  so  far  as  it  is  possible  to  compare  two  widely 
separated  social,  political,  and  economic  eras,  the 
analogy  holds.  In  America  however  the  sole  aim 
was  political  democracy ;  for  in  that  day  the  founda- 
tions of  democracy  had  not  yet  shifted  from  legis- 
latures to  banks  and  bourses,  and  there  was  no  in- 
dustrial autocracy  to  fight.  Today  in  Russia,  in  a 
world  many  generations  removed  from  that  of  our 
forefathers  on  the  score  of  economic  progress,  the 
aim  is  social  and  industrial  democracy  through  po- 
litical democracy.  The  legislative  fundamentals 
were  of  course  more  firmly  established  among  the 
Thirteen  Colonies  than  they  are  in  Soviet  Russia; 
the  electorate  may  have  been  better  trained  in  self- 
government,  and  the  necessary  administrative  ma- 
chinery and  personnel  were  unquestionably  far  more 
extensive;  but  on  the  other  hand,  these  very  facts 
entailed  a  set  of  firmly  grounded  local  antagonisms 
among  the  Colonies  which  is  largely  absent  in  the 
case  of  Soviet  Russia.  What  might  be  called  the 
potential  cohesion  of  Soviet  Russia  is  probably 
sounder  and  more  substantial  than  was  that  of  the 
Thirteen  Colonies,  or  in  other  words  the  danger 
of  disruption  is  less.  The  potentialities  in  America 
in  1788  were  exceedingly  treacherous;  and  Amer- 
ica's federal  cohesion  was  not  finally  established  until 
the  close  of  the  Civil  War  in  1865.  And  for  a  last 
item  of  the  analogy,  the  case  of  Russia,  like  that  of 
the  Thirteen  Colonies,  demands  the  utmost  wisdom 
of  reconciliation  and  vision  of  brave  and  constructive 


SOVIET  RUSSIA  -  2 1 

leadership,  and  this  not  only  in  Russia,  but  quite  as 
much  on  the  part  of  the  world  abroad. 

When  we  turn  from  the  political  to  the  economic 
phase  of  Soviet  Russia,  we  see  that  they  are  the 
obverse  and  reverse  of  the  same  shield.  However 
seriously  Soviet  Russia  may  have  avowed  the  prin- 
ciples of  Marxian  Socialism,  it  is  evident  that  the 
application  of  the  program  has  not  worked  out  along 
dogmatic  lines,  and  that  the  final  result  will  be  far 
different  from  the  original  theory.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  there  seems  to  be  much  misunderstanding  re- 
garding the  Socialistic  nature  of  the  Bolshevik  mani- 
festation, and  room  for  grave  doubt  of  its  orthodoxy ; 
reports  are  infinitely  confusing,  and  passion  or 
prejudice  almost  unavoidably  colors  the  account. 
The  impression  generally  accepted  through  the  West 
is  that  the  Soviets  are  instituting  Marxian  Socialism. 
But  it  has  not  yet  been  explained  why  formal  Social- 
ists everjrwhere,  in  Russia  as  well  as  in  the  Allied 
countries  and  America,  are  the  bitterest  enemies  of 
Bolshevism.  It  has  not  been  explained  precisely 
what  Bolshevism  is.  The  fact  seems  to  be  that 
Bolshevism  is  something  entirely  new,  something 
which  partakes  of  the  nature  of  both  communism 
and  democracy,  of  both  Socialism  and  capitalism — 
something  which  has  split  Socialism  everywhere  and 
caused  the  majority  of  Socialists  to  shift  their 
ground,  leaving  only  the  dogmatic  minority  within 
the  walls  of  the  academic  Marxian  doctrine.  The 
Bolsheviki  in  control  of  Soviet  Russia  have  awakened 
the  thought  of  the  world. 

All  this  is  a  healthy  and  hopeful  sign.  It  means 
that  the  social  program  of  Soviet  Russia  is  as  new 
and  untried  as  its  political  machinery;  that  both  are 
in  a  process  of  rapid  development,  seeking  im- 
petuously to  find  their  true  bearings;  and  that  both 
inevitably  are  destined  to  grow  out  of  themselves 
into  more  stable  and  adaptable  forms.  The  thing 
which  has  appeared  in  Russia  is  a  thing  without 


22  SOVIET  RUSSIA 

theory  or  precedent.  In  a  strictly  literal  sense  it  is 
a  natural  development.  It  is  not  to  be  estimated  by 
physical  events,  or  even  by  the  acts  or  announced 
policies  of  the  Soviet  authority,  but  only  by  a  free 
analysis  of  the  tendencies  and  potentialities  made 
manifest.  What  it  is  heading  towards,  what  it  must 
become,  is  of  far  more  importance  than  what  it  is 
today.  After  a  year  of  chaos,  in  which  ideas  of 
Socialism,  communism,  and  anarchy  have  run  riot 
along  with  sublime  visions  and  great  hopes  in  the 
minds  of  a  people  untutored,  elemental,  natively 
philosophic,  and  suffering  from  tragic  wrongs — a 
people  nobly  disposed  at  heart,  and  suddenly  en- 
dowed with  the  tremendous  burden  of  its  own  (and 
perhaps  the  world's)  destiny — it  is  possible  to  dis- 
cern the  vague  but  nevertheless  certain  outlines  of 
a  cosmic  plan,  standing  solidly  in  the  background  of 
the  Revolutionary  picture. 

This  plan  is  neither  Socialistic  nor  communistic. 
It  is  neither  a  bourgeois  plan  nor  a  proletarian  plan. 
It  is  the  plan  of  a  free  and  outright  representative 
democracy,  of  the  rule  of  the  actual  majority,  of 
natural  resources  and  all  forms  of  national  wealth 
and  productive  power  in  the  hands  of  the  people,  of 
work  for  production  rather  than  for  profit,  and  of 
government  for  service  rather  than  for  privilege. 
This  is  the  objective  towards  which  Soviet  Russia 
is  heading.  These  are  the  real  tendencies  and  po- 
tentialities of  Bolshevism. 

In  a  modern  economic  sense  Russia  is  a  clean 
slate  to  write  on.  It  is  stated  that  less  than  three 
per  cent  of  her  population  is  made  up  of  industrial 
workers.  Russia  is  still  almost  wholly  an  agri- 
cultural state.  Her  vast  natural  resources  lie  prac- 
tically untouched ;  the  well  of  her  stupendous 
productive  power  remains  unopened.  Only  an 
insignificant  proportion  of  her  wealth  is  invested  in 
the  mechanical  industries.  But  it  is  inevitable  that 
in  the  course  of  the  next  fifty  years  Russia  will  be- 


SOVIET  RUSSIA  23 

come  to  a  large  degree  industrialized.  Millions  and 
tens  of  millions  of  agricultural  workers  will  become 
factory  workers;  enormous  new  wealth  will  be 
created,  and  the  most  of  it  will  be  invested  in  the 
mechanical  industries;  the  color  and  texture  of  the 
whole  social  fabric  of  Russia  will  change.  The 
prospect  is  overwhelming;  nowhere  in  history  has 
such  a  field  disclosed  itself  to  an  era  so  ready  to 
seize  and  act  upon  it.  The  sweep  of  possibilities  in 
Russia  staggers  the  imagination.  It  stills  the  heart, 
as  well,  to  realize  that  we  of  the  Western  democra- 
cies are  permitted  to  assist  at  the  birth  of  this  new 
giant,  and  that  all  that  we  do,  either  right  or  wrong, 
for  or  against,  shall  surely  afEect  the  history  of  a 
great  people,  and  shall  as  surely  react  upon  the  his- 
tory of  our  children's  children. 

What  shall  be  written  on  the  clean  economic 
slate  of  Russia?  What  shall  be  the  fortune  of  that 
portentous  economic  history  which  is  even  now  be- 
ginning to  unfold  itself?  Shall  it  be  permitted  to 
develop  naturally  under  the  control  of  the  Russian 
people,  along  with  the  development  of  Russia's  free 
political  institutions?  Shall  we  in  America  and  in 
the  Allied  countries  seek  with  all  of  our  wisdom 
and  experience  to  assist  Russia  to  avoid  the  errors 
into  which  Western  democracy  has  fallen  in  the 
course  of  its  industrial  development?  Shall  we 
rejoice  in  the  opportunity  to  put  into  effect  in  Rus- 
sia, as  stones  in  the  foundation,  those  reforms  for 
which  Western  democracy  has  had  to  pay  such  a 
heavy  price  in  the  demolition  of  the  structure  ?  Or 
shall  we,  actuated  only  by  selfish  motives,  inspired 
only  by  greed  and  materialism,  aware  only  of  the 
temporary  profit  and  reckless  of  the  eternal  conse- 
quence, break  up  the  natural  development  of 
Russia's  economic  and  political  destiny  (the  while 
we  hypocritically  explain  that  we  are  doing  it  for 
Russia's  benefit)  and  insist  on  grafting  all  of  our 
own  errors  and  vices  on  the  free  Russian  stenl  ?    To 


24  SOVIET  RUSSIA 

be  specific,  shall  Russia  be  left  to  develop  her  own 
natural  resources  and  productive  power,  under  the 
control  of  her  own  popular  government,  or  shall  she 
be  forced  to  undergo  for  a  time  the  familiar  proc- 
ess of  exploitation  at  the  hands  of  foreign  capital 
backed  by  foreign  arms?  Shall  her  enormous  po- 
tential wealth  accrue  to.  herself,  to  her  people,  to  , 
the  benefit  of  Russia,  or  shall  it  accrue  to  banking 
circles  in  foreign  capitals  and  to  the  close  corporation 
of  vested  financial  control? 

The  latter  course  would  seem  to  be  monstrous; 
and  yet  it  is  the  course  which  so  far  frankly  has 
been  followed  by  Allied  and  American  policy.  It  is' 
the  course  which  has  prompted  the  bourgeoisie  in 
Russia  to  revolt  frantically  against  the  Soviets;  it  is 
the  course  which  has  led  the  Allies  (in  unconscious 
agreement  with  Imperial  Germany)  to  support 
counter-revolution  after  counter-revolution  in 
Russia;  it  is  the  course  which  has  inspired  a 
propaganda  from  Russia  utterly  misrepresienting 
events  and  issues;  it  is  the  course  which  has  called 
for  military  intervention,  for  recognition  of  a 
Siberian  Government,  for  any  possible  action  cal- 
culated to  break  down  the  authority  of  the  Soviet 
system.  The  motive  in  all  these  acts  has  been  the 
spirit  of  exploitation,  which,  when  driven  into  the 
corner,  takes  refuge  in  the  claim  that  only  through 
the  machinery  of  the  old  economic  order  can  Russia 
properly  be  saved. 

The  West  perhaps  may  have'  the  power  to  break 
the  new  Russian  democracy,  although  the  breaker 
will  be  broken  in  the  end.  But  the  responsibility 
goes  farther  than  the  immediate  issue.  To  break 
the  new  Russian  democracy  means,  in  no  uncertain 
language,  to  lose  the  fight  for  the  new  world.  It 
means  that  the  great  war  which  has  just  now  ended 
will  have  to  be  fought  over  again  quite  soon  and  very 
terribly  on  a  different  field.  For  the  fact  cannot  be 
evaded  that,  stripped  of  misrepresentation  and  de- 


SOVIET  RUSSIA  25 

lusion,  Soviet  Russians  objective  is  essentially  the 
same  as  the  avowed  objective  of  America  and  the 
Allies;  or  that  the  tendencies  and  potentialities  of 
Bolshevism  differ  only  in  degree,  but  not  in  kind, 
from  those  inherent  in  all  Western  democracy. 
They  represent  the  same  broad  fundamentals  which 
find  expression  in  the  war  aims  of  President  Wilson, 
in  the  reconstruction  program  of  the  British  Labor 
Party,  in  the  program  of  the  new  Independent 
Labor  Party  in  America,  and  in  the  language  of 
thoughtful  men  everywhere  when  they  discuss  the 
growing  inadequacies  and  palpable  failures  of  our 
present  governmental  machinery.  When  we  visual- 
ize industrial  democracy  for  America,  we  visualize 
a  state  not  so  far  different  from  the  state  fore- 
shadowed by  the  tendencies  and  potentialities  of 
Soviet  Russia.  Thus  by  the  inexorable  logic  of 
human  progress  the  truth  in  Russia  is  bound  up  with 
the  truth  throughout  the  West;  and  if  the  West 
deny  the  truth  in  Russia,  it  will  have  denied  the 
truth  at  home.  And  truth  denied  will  launch  the 
cataclysm. 

It  rests  with  the  statesmanship  of  America  and 
the  Allies  whether  our  ostensible  objective  shall  be- 
come our  real  objective,  and  shall  be  attained,  or 
whether  the  compromise  must  be  carried  forward  to 
disaster;  whether  Russia's  contribution  ta. democracy 
shall  be  recognized  and  accepted,  or  whether  it  shall 
be  spurned  and  scattered,  to  appear  anon  behind  the 
lines  of  the  entrenched  and  self-righteous  authori- 
ties; whether  the  West  can  learn  its  lesson  in  time, 
or  whether  civilization  must  go  down  in  ruins  be- 
fore the  new  world  appears. 

Lincoln  Colcord. 


A  Voice  Out  of  Russia 

Americans  have  always  pictured  Russia  as  some 
fairyland  such  as  India  or  Tibet.  Formerly  it  was 
the  land  of  the  Czars,  the  whip,  and  the  Cossack, 
and  now  it  is  the  land  of  the  still  less  comprehensible 
Bolsheviki.  Yet  there  is  a  great  likeness  in  char- 
acter between  Americans  and  Russians  :1or  instance, 
devotion  to  land,  love  of  liberty,  natural  humor, 
and  a  carefree  attitude.  But  there  is  a  great  dif- 
ference, owing  to  historic  reasons,  between  the  mode 
of  life  of  the  United  States  and  that  of  Russia.  First 
of  all,  the  white  pioneers  went  into  the  forests  and 
prairies  of  this  country  one  by  one  or  in  small  groups 
and  settled  immediately  as  individual  farmers. 
The  Russian  people  migrated  a  thousand  years  ago 
from  the  Carpathians  to  the  east  en  masse.  They 
occupied  lands  for  "artels**  (groups).  During  that 
thousand  years  they  grew  accustomed  to  cultivating 
the  land  by  communistic  methods.  But  the  Ameri- 
can farmer  is  first  of  all  an  owner,  whereas  the 
Russian  peasant  is  a  communist — and  here  lies  the 
reason  of  the  success  of  Socialistic  teaching  in  Rus- 
sia. Second,  in  America  material  and  spiritual 
advantages  are  distributed  among  the  population 
more  evenly  than  in  Russia.  Until  the  very  out- 
break of  the  Revolution  the  law  distinctly  divided 
the  Russian  "subjects"  into  two  uneven  parts:  3  per 
cent  of  the  population  were  the  so-called  "priv- 
ileged" classes  and  97  per  cent  the  so-called  "tax- 
paying"  people.  All  comforts  and  necessities  of 
life,  including  education,  were  the  privilege  of  the 
3  per  cent ;  admittance  to  high  schools  and  universi- 
ties, to  state  service  and  officers*  rank  was  totally 
closed  to  the  97  per  cent.     It  should  not  be  for- 


A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA  27 

gotten  that  85  per  cent  of  the  population  were  freed 
from  the  state  of  slavery  only  fifty-eight  years  ago, 
and  naturally  they  still  bear  much  malice  to  their 
former  masters.  But  even  among  the  3  per  cent 
of  the  privileged  there  was  not  full  content;  the 
capitalistic  class  and  the  Intelligentsia  were  de- 
prived of  political  power,  which  was  monopolized 
by  court  adventurers.  Discontent  was  universal. 
It  was  already  evident  in  1905,  but  not  being  suffici- 
ently organized,  it  was  crushed. 

The  war  precipitated  the  climax.  It  is  well 
known  that  the  war  found  Russia  inadequately 
prepared.  Nevertheless  we  performed  the  self- 
imposed  duties  more  than  honestly;  we  performed 
them  with  self-sacrifice.  And  this  did  not  fail  to 
react;  owing  to  the  undeveloped  state  of  our  eco- 
nomic life  we  were  ruined  by  hunger  and  poverty 
by  the  third  year  of  the  war. 

This  did  not  happen  at  once.  We  passed  three 
stages  in  falling  down  the  slope.  The  first  stage 
passed  with  the  cry:  "The  war  will  end  soon!" 
Owing  to  this  belief  the  factories  and  shops  con- 
tinued to  work  according  to  the  usual  peace  pro- 
gram and  met  the  demands  of  the  consumers  at  the 
expense  of  the  army^s  needs.  Russia  had  everything 
in  abundance;  moreover  the  cessation  of  exports 
created  a  surplus  of  goods.  The  heart  of  the  country 
did  not  feel  the  hardships  of  the  war.  It  is  true  that 
12,000,000  youths  and  men  were  torn  away  from 
their  families,  but  the  tears  for  them  dissolved  in 
the  ocean  of  apathy  and  plenty  brought  about  by  the 
flow  of  money  into  the  villages.  The  last  is  of  such 
great  importance  that  we  must  go  into  details  of  it. 
We  know  what  enormous  expenditures  a  modern 
war  requires.     Russia  did  not  have  enough  gold. 


28  A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA 

and  attempts  to  raise  internal  loans  were  unsuccess- 
ful, owing  to  the  ignorance  of  the  masses.  Therefore 
only  one  way  was  open  to  us,  to  print  paper  money. 
The  sudden  increase  of  its  amount  in  circulation 
did  not  fail  to  show  results;  the  ruble  began  to  fall 
in  value  and  prices  of  commodities  began  to  increase 
^accordingly.  Inasmuch  as  the  peasant  was  getting 
double  prices,  the  peasant  sold  everything:  grain, 
cattle,  linen,  grandmother's  dresses.  "The  village  is 
growing  rich,"  shouted  the  newspapers. 

But  soon,  very  soon,  the  Russian  peasant  learned 
a  bitter  lesson  as  to  the  value  of  money.  As  thunder 
from  a  clear  sky  came  the  news  of  our  retreat  from 
the  Carpathians  in  the  spring  of  1915.  It  was 
found  that  in  order  to  proceed  with  the  war  we 
lacked  the  most  necessary  commodities ;  it  was  found 
that  our  children  and  fathers  were  facing  the  most 
cruel  and  powerful  enemy  totally  unarmed.  This 
brought  about  a  feverish  mobilization  of  our  in- 
dustry. 

The  second  stage  ensued  and  ran  under  the  motto : 
"Everything  for  the  war."  We  sacrificed  our  en- 
tire industry  to  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  We  did 
not  merely  cease  to  manufacture  nails,  candles,  and 
agricultural  machinery,  but  we  even  gave  up  75  per 
cent  of  our  textile  industry  for  war  needs.  And 
thus  the  so-called  goods  famine  ensued.  But  the 
country  did  not  have  articles  of  necessity,  and  al- 
though goods  were  yet  to  be  obtained  in  the  cities 
nothing  reached  the  village.  Having  money  on  hand, 
the  peasant  found  that  he  could  not  purchase  any- 
thing with  it.  He  could  not  understand  it  at  first, 
but  when  he  realized  it,  he  became  very  angry  and 
refused  to  sell  grain  for  the  army  and  cities.  "I 
don't  want  your  money,"  he  said  to  the  agents  of 


A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA  29 

the  Government  and  to  merchants  who  would  come 
for  the  grain.  "Give  me  gingham,  nails,  scythes, 
boots — and  unless  you  give  me  these,  you  will  not 
get  my  grain."  During  the  Czar's  regime  even 
flogging  was  resorted  to,  but  the  peasant  was  quite 
determined  in  his  refusal  to  sell  grain. 

As  a  result  of  this  the  army  and  the  cities  re- 
mained without  bread,  and  the  cattle  were  partly 
consumed  and  partly  starved  by  lack  of  hay.  A 
shortage  of  foodstuffs  began,  and  in  addition  to  this 
many  refugees  from  Poland  and  Lithuania  fled  in 
the  fall  of  1915  to  the  interior  cities.  Nevertheless 
we  managed  to  push  through  the  trying  winter  of 
1915-16.  And  in  the  fall  of  1916  the  situation 
became  still  worse.  Due  to  additional  recruiting  of 
soldiers  a  shortage  of  labor  occurred.  The  culti- 
vated area  suffered  a  decrease  of  30  per  cent.  And 
then  in  November  there  was  an  acute  shortage  of 
locomotives  on  the  railroads.  We  never  had  had 
many  of  them.  And  during  the  war,  owing  to  the  in- 
tensive usage,  they  were  worn  out  and  there  was  no 
means  of  repairing  them.  As  a  result  of  this,  the 
railroads  were  totally  disorganized.  On  the  Don 
and  in  Siberia,  for  instance,  grain  and  hay  were 
rotting  at  the  stations,  while  on  the  Roumanian 
front  I  personally  witnessed  how  thousands  of  horses 
were  falling  of  exhaustion  and  hunger.  And  the 
inhabitants  had  to  sustain  themselves  upon  the  meat 
of  these  fallen  horses.  Conditions  in  the  cities  were 
not  much  better.  Hunger  and  cold  penetrated 
everywhere.  The  most  timid  citizens  began  to 
complain  and  protest.  And  what  meanwhile  was 
going  on  within  the  Government  ?  Dissipation  with 
Rasputin  and  the  placing  of  favorites  in  ministerial 
posts.    All  slightly  capable  ministers,  in  spite  of  pub- 


30  A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA 

lie  opinion,  were  driven  out  and  in  their  places  were 
put  known  thieves,  cretins,  and  traitors.  A  sort  of 
madness,  hopeless  madness,  enveloped  Tsarskoye 
Selo  and  in  the  name  of  the  weak-willed,  drunken 
Nicholas  the  Russian  people  were  governed  by  his 
German  wife  and  a  clique  of  scoundrels.  Loyal 
hands,  desiring  to  uphold  the  prestige  of  the  throne, 
assassinated  Rasputin ;  but  in  answer  to  this  followed 
orgies  over  his  corpse,  the  '^provocation"  of  street 
disturbances  in  Petrograd,  and  the  dispersing  of  the 
Duma.  Then  the  moment  came  when  all  of  us — 
from  Lenin  to  Purishkevitch  (the  leader  of  the 
famous  "Black  Hundred") — understood  that  this 
sort  of  thing  could  not  continue  any  longer,  that  the 
Czar's  regime  had  outlived  itself.  And  it  fell — fell 
painlessly  and  with  ease,  as  a  decayed  apple  falls 
from  a  tree. 

In  place  of  Nicholas  II  came  the  Government  of 
Prince  Lvoif,  the  Government  of  Cadets — a  revolu- 
tionary Government  without  revolutionists.  I  shall 
never  forget  the  comment  about  this  Government  by 
a  former  minister  of  the  Czar,  Krivoshein.  "This 
Government,"  said  Krivoshein  after  he  was  told  of 
its  composition,  "has  one  great  fault;  it  is  too  mod- 
erate. Two  months  ago  it  would  have  satisfied  the 
country ;  now  it  is  too  late.  It  will  not  have  power, 
and  thus.  Sirs,  you  will  sacrifice  your  own  newborn 
child — the  Revolution — and  also  our  all-beloved 
Fatherland,  Russia."  These  words  proved  to  be 
prophetic.  The  composition  of  the  First  Provisional 
Government  was  not  in  accordance  with  the  senti- 
ment of  the  country.  And  as  a  result,  side  by  side  I 
with  this  Government,  sprang  up  the  Soviets,  backed  ^ 
by  the  confidence  of  the  great  masses  of  the  people. 
Among  the  ministers  of  the  First  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment there  were  to  be  found  no  men  with  tech- 


A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA  31 

nical  experience  of  state  administration.  LvofE  and 
Miliukoif  gave  ministerial  places  to  their  party 
friends.  The  Director  of  the  Imperial  Ballet  was 
given  the  portfolio  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance;  a 
physician,  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture. 

The  organization  of  the  Second  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment, which  included  representatives  of  the  radi- 
cal bourgeoisie  and  Moderate  Socialists,  slightly 
changed  the  picture.  They  could  not  very  well 
agree.  Creative  energy  was  expended  in  internal 
strife.  The  compromised  decisions  were  not  clear. 
The  Second  Provisional  Government  also  lacked 
state  experience  and  will-power.  Doubtless  the 
burden  placed  upon  these  governments  by  events 
proved  to  be  too  heavy.  The  time  demanded 
giants,  but  instead  found  midgets.  But  what  was 
the  problem  of  both  Provisional  Governments  with 
which  they  could  not  cope?  The  Provisional  Gov- 
ernments themselves  were  saying  that  their  aim  was 
to  call  a  Constituent  Assembly.  They  did  not 
realize  that  the  Constituent  Assembly  was  not  the 
final  end,  hut  only  a  means,  a  means  of  expressing 
the  will  of  the  people  and  of  solving  problems  placed 
before  them.  The  substantial  mistake  of  both  Pro- 
visional Governments  was  that  they  mistook  the 
means  for  the  end. 

When  the  March  Revolution  broke  out  three 
colossal  questions  confronted  the  Russian  people: 

1.  What  is  to  be  done  about  the  war? 

2.  How  is  the  Russian  state  to  be  organized? 

3.  How  are  famine  and  economic  disintegration 
to  be  stopped? 

Now, the  Constituent  Assembly  was  to  be  con- 
voked in  ten  months.  Even  in  normal  peaceful 
times  it  is  impossible  to  stop  the  curr-ent  of  life  for 


32  A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA 

ten  months.  And  a  revolution  is  a  social  condition 
in  which  the  pulsation  of  events  is  increased  ten  to 
twentyfold.  It  ought  to  have  been  self-evident  that 
the  wheel  of  national  life  could  not  be  stopped  for 
ten  months  either  by  LvofE  or  Kerensky.  No  matter 
how  they  urged  the  convocation  of  the  Constituent 
Assembly,  they  were  themselves  compelled  by  force 
of  events  to  solve,  little  by  little,  the  very  questions 
which  they  desired  to  give  over  to  the  decision  of  the 
Constituent  Assembly. 

Consider  the  problem  of  the  war.  Was  it  possible 
to  say  to  the  Germans:  "Wait,  gentlemen.  Do  not 
shoot  until  the  Constituent  Assembly  meets.  When 
it  meets,  it  will  decide  whether  or  not  we  shall  go 
on  killing  you"?  Even  the  Allies  would  not  agree 
to  such  a  decision.  Yet  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  we 
had  sacrificed  for  the  Allies  about  seven  millions  of 
our  sons,  they  demanded  that  revolutionary  Russia 
should  participate  more  actively  in  the  war. 

An  answer  to  these  demands  should  have  been 
given  immediately.  To  postpone  the  answer  until 
the  convocation  of  the  Constituent  Assembly  was 
impossible.  The  Provisional  Government  realized 
perfectly  well  that  a  hungry,  barefooted  Russia, 
with  its  disorganized  railroads,  could  not  possibly 
wage  war  even  as  it  had  during  the  Czar's  regime. 
And  the  treaties  signed  by  the  Czar  and  the  Allies 
could  have  no  moral  significance  for  free  Russia. 
Therefore  the  circumstances  and  the  dignity  of  Rus- 
sia required  that  the  Provisional  Government  give 
to  its  Allies  a  friendly  but  firm  repulse.  It  should 
have  demanded  immediate  aid  and  should  even  have 
threatened  separate  peace.  At  that  time  we  still  had 
an  army,  and  the  Germans  would  have  paid  us 
highly  for  a  separate  peace.     But  our  youthful  min- 


A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA  33 

isters  and  ambassadors,  instead  of  taking  such  a  firm 
course,  bowed  before  the  Allies,  and  gave  all  sorts 
of  assurances  that  Russia  would  never  conclude  a 
separate  peace.  Why  then  should  the  Allies  have 
hastened  with  material  aid  to  Russia?  I  do  not 
blame  them  for  it.  ''One's  own  interests  are  near- 
est.*' And  meanwhile  the  army  was  diminishing 
and  diminishing — hunger  had  driven  the  soldiers 
from  the  trenches. 

State  administration  presented  a  similar  picture. 
Its  problems  could  not  be  postponed  until  the  con- 
vocation of  the  Constituent  Assembly.  By  force  of 
events  the  Provisional  Government  was  compelled 
to  tolerate  the  self-appointed  unlawful  Soviets;  more 
than  that,  they  had  to  listen  to  their  demands  at- 
tentively and  as  a  result  to  proclaim  Russia  a  Re- 
public. This  measure  undoubtedly  undermined  the 
prestige  of  the  Constituent  Assembly  and  the  belief 
in  its  indispensability.  For  this  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernments could  scarcely  be  blamed.  Their  fault 
was  that  they  had  remained  behind  the  current  of 
h'fe  and  the  expectations  of  the  people.  And  what 
were  these  expectations?  The  capitalists  and  the 
Intelligentsia,  approximately  lj4  per  cent  of  the 
population,  were  dreaming  only  of  seizing  political 
power.  The  peasants — 75  per  cent  of  the  popula- 
tion— were  dreaming  of  the  land.  The  soldiers — and 
these  numbered  about  10  per  cent  of  the  popula- 
tion— dreamed  of  peace  and  of  returning  to  their 
dear  ones  at  home ;  and  finally,  the  workingmen,  who 
numbered  also  about  10  per  cent,  dreamed  of  seizing 
control  of  industry. 

The  Provisional  Governments  promised  every- 
thing, but  asked  for  delay  until  the  convocation  of 
the  Constituent  Assembly.  But  the  peasants  and 
workers  preferred  to  realize  their  desire  to  get  the 


34  A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA 

land  and  the  means  of  production  immediately  by 
revolutionary  means.  *'This  is  safer.  At  present 
the  power  is  in  our  hands,  and  what  will  happen 
tomorrow,  we  do  not  know."  This  was  well  under- 
stood by  the  Bolsheviki  and  this  is  where  the  meaning 
of  their  doctrine,  "the  deepening  of  the  Revolution" 
— that  is,  the  immediate  realization  of  the  people's 
desires  through  revolutionary  means — lies.  And 
here  lies  the  cause  of  their  success. 

Much  is  being  said  at  present  that  such  a  solution 
of  social  problems  is  not  democratic,  that  violence 
from  the  Left  is  just  as  hideous  as  violence  from  the 
Right.  In  substance  this  is  true,  but  the  trouble  is 
that  the  Kingdom  of  God  on  eai^th  has  not  come  as 
yet,  and  force  can  be  crushed  only  by  force.  Every 
revolution  provokes  violence;  why,  asked  the  Rus- 
sians, is  it  justifiable  to  overthrow  the  Czar  by  force, 
and  not  the  bankers? 

But  I  have  anticipated.  Before  speaking  of  the 
present,  let  us  return  to  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ments and*  see  how  they  solved  the  third  funda- 
mental problem;  that  is,  the  reorganization  of  the 
economic  life  of  the  country.  The  question  can  be 
answered  in  a  few  words:  "They  did  not  solve." 
Lacking  economic  experience  and  not  venturing,  for 
fear  of  the  Allies,  to  decrease  war  production  or  the 
number  of  soldiers  at  the  front,  the  Provisional 
Governments  enacted  nothing  new.  And  conditions 
were  growing  worse;  occupied  with  the  "deepening 
of  the  Revolution,"  the  workmen  hardly  worked. 
The  productivity  of  shops  and  factories  decreased 
manyfold.  General  economic  disintegration  con- 
stantly increased.  The  villages  had  no  goods,  and 
the  cities  and  army  had  no  bread.  A  real  famine 
ensued  and  this  was  followed  as  usual  by  robberies 


A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA  35 

and  violence.  They  reached  their  height  in  August- 
September  of  1917 — about  two  months  before 
the  Bolshevik  Revolution  took  place.  The  Pro- 
visional Government  even  at  that  time  had  no 
authority  or  power.  The  prestige  of  any  power  is 
always  best  measured  by  the  forces  that  rally  around 
it  for  its  defense.  And  the  Provisional  Government 
for  its  defense  could  only  rally  Junkers,  a  few  Cos- 
sacks, and  the  Women's  Battalion  of  Death.  And 
it  can  hardly  be  said  that  the  Bolshevik  ofiFensive 
was  an  unexpected  blow  to  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment. Just  the  reverse:  the  Bolsheviki  widely  ad- 
vertised it  two  weeks  in  advance,  so  that  the  Provi- 
sional Government  had  sufficient  foreknowledge.  It 
is  therefore  evident  that  it  was  in  possession  of 
defensive  forces  and  that  the  popularity  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government  w^as  not  greater  than  that  of 
the  Czar's. 

One  way  or  another,  fourteen  months  ago  the 
power  was  transferred  definitely  and  finally  to  the 
Soviets,  with  the  Bolsheviki  as  the  dominating  po- 
litical power.  And  thus  came  their  turn  to  decide 
the  vital  questions  of  war,  state,  and  economic 
organization.  The  question  of  the  war  they  decided 
to  solve  immediately.  They  disclosed  the  secret 
treaties  showing  imperialistic  war  aims  of  the  En- 
tente, at  the  same  time  offering  the  Allies  a  general 
democratic  peace.  The  latter  did  not  even  answer ! 
And  this  fact  is  of  utmost  importance,  because  it 
arouses  serious  doubt  as  to  who  was  betrayed  by 
whom — whether  we  have  betrayed  the  Allies,  or  the 
Allies  have  betrayed  us.  Not  having  received  any 
answer,  the  Soviet  Government  started  pourparlers 
for  a  separate  peace.  It  could  not  possibly  have 
acted  differently.     It  was  impossible  to  wage  war 


36  A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA 

further:  the  army  had  run  away,  the  railroads  had 
come  to  a  standstill.  Nevertheless,  vrhen  the  preda- 
tory tendencies  of  the  Kaiser  became  evident,  the 
Soviet  Government  delayed  the  ratification  of  the 
peace  treaty  and  entered  into  negotiations  with  the 
Allies,  promising  to  reestablish  the  Russian  front  if 
the  Allies  would  come  to  their  aid.  The  Allies  did 
not  accept  this  proposal,  the  sincerity  of  which  can 
hardly  be  doubted.  Lenin  was  obliged  to  present 
the  B rest-Li tovsk  peace  treaty  for  ratification  to  the 
Congress  of  Soviets.  At  that  moment,  as  far  as  I 
am  concerned,  the  question  as  to  who  betrayed 
whom  was  finally  understood  and  decided.  Upon 
presenting  the  peace  treaty  for  ratification  of  the 
Congress,  Lenin  did  not  deny  it  was  humiliating. 
But  at  the  same  time  he  insisted  that  this  humilia- 
tion was  temporary,  that  the  German  revolution  was 
not  far  away.  Many  did  not  believe  it  at  that  time, 
but  now  the  German  revolution  is  an  accomplished 
fact. 

As  far  as  state  organization  was  concerned,  the 
Soviet  Government  decided  that  at  that  time  the 
question  could  be  postponed.  Russia  was  in  the 
throes  of  a  social  revolution  and  in  the  midst  of  a 
struggle  with  internal  and  external  enemies  of  the 
new  order.  Russia  is  being  built  by  the  plain  people, 
by  the  peasants — slowly,  firmly,  and  without  any 
definite  plan.  To  foretell  into  what  forms  this  re- 
building will  finally  shape  is  utterly  impossible.  It 
can,  however,  be  definitely  said  that  the  present 
rebuilding  of  Russia  is  not  the  last  word  of  the  Rus- 
sian Revolution.  The  word  "Soviet"  will  probably 
remain  with  us  forever.  The  Russian  people  grew 
fond  of  it.  It  was  also  adopted  in  Germany,  but 
the  meaning  attached  to  this  word  will  be  perfected 


A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA  37 

in  the  future.  However,  it  must  be  kept  in  mind 
that  the  controversy  which  split  Russian  society  into 
two  uncompromising  camps  does  not  pertain  to  its 
meaning.  This  controversy  does  not  formally  touch 
upon  the  ideology  of  the  future,  but  solely  concerns 
the  tactics  of  the  present.  The  adherents  of  one 
camp  say  that  it  is  first  necessary  to  shape  Russia 
into  a  definite  political  form,  to  establish  a  per- 
manent government  and  to  let  it  decide  social  prob- 
lems slowly;  that  it  is  beyond  the  strength  of  the 
Russian  people  to  accomplish  a  social  and  political 
revolution  at  the  same  time;  that  it  is  necessary  to 
be  satisfied  for  the  present  with  the  political  re^olu- 
tion  alone,  and  to  bring  about  the  social  retorms 
through  evolution.  More  than  that,  representatives 
of  this  camp  insist  that  our  people  are  young  and 
"dark" ;  that  the  time  has  not  arrived  for  them  to 
decide  their  own  destiny;  that  the  people  do  not 
know  what  they  need,  but  that  they,  the  representa- 
tives of  the  radicals  and  the  Socialist  Intelligentsia, 
do  know.  Therefore  they  are  the  ones  to  govern 
the  "dark"  people,  to  educate  the  people,  to  prepare 
the  people  for  self-government. 

The  representatives  of  the  opposition  camp,  on  the 
other  hand,  insist  that  their  experiences  with  the 
first  two  Provisional  Governments  and  especially 
with  the  third — the  Omsk  Government,  which  is 
now  dormant  in  the  pocket  of  Kolchak — is  sufficient 
warning  not  to  repeat  mistakes.  Their  deep  con- 
viction is  that  the  Russian  people  are  interested  most 
of  all  in  social  reforms  and  demand  these  reforms 
immediately  by  revolutionary  means.  Yes,  the  Rus- 
sian people  are  "dark"  and  uncultured,  but  they  pos- 
sess a  natural  common  sense.  They  will  acquire 
their  knowledge   in   the  process  of   reconstruction. 


38  A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA 

Without  the  Intelligentsia  they  cannot  possibly 
get  along,  but  they  want  to  select  from  the  latter 
those  who  are  willing  to  serve  them,  and  not  those 
who  want  to  govern  them  against  their  will.  The 
"darkness"  of  the  Russian  masses  naturally  obstructs 
the  tempo  of  the  Russian  Revolution.  I  repeat, 
Russia  is  being  rebuilt  by  the  peasants — slowly, 
firmly,  and  without  any  definite  plan.  In  this  proc- 
ess of  rebuilding  much  has  to  be  broken  down.  It 
is  also  true  that  it  is  beyond  the  power  of  the  Russian 
people  to  accomplish  both  political  and  social  recon- 
struction. Now  the  Russian  people  are  busy  with 
the  construction  of  a  new  social  order,  and  when 
this  shall  have  been  crystallized  into  definite  form, 
they  can  begin  the  political  construction  of  Russia. 

It  can  be  foretold  already  that  for  the  new  social 
conditions  new  political  forms  will  be  required.  It 
may  also  be  predicted  that  neither  the  French  nor 
the  American  clothes  will  fit  the  free  Russian  peas- 
ant; it  will  be  necessary  to  sew  special  Russian 
clothes  of  new  cuts.  And  such  work  requires  time 
and  care:  "Measure  the  cloth  seven  times  and  cut  it 
once,"  says  an  old  Russian  proverb.  And  history 
confirms  it.  Of  all  the  constitutions  that  were  ever 
written  on  our  planet,  the  most  flexible  one  has 
proved  to  be  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 
Written  in  1787,  with  seventeen  amendments,  it  is 
alive  today.  But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  it 
was  written  in  1787,  eleven  years  after  the  Declara- 
tion of  Independence.  Why  then  ask  of  Russia  that 
she  write  her  political  constitution  in  definite 
form  only  one  year  after  the  Revolution,  a  revolution 
deeper  than  that  of  1776?  It  may  be  retorted  that 
social  reforms  require  just  as  much  care;  that  they 
also  cannot  be  decided  in  haste.     I  perfectly  agree 


A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA  39 

With  this,  but  I  also  understand  that  the  Russian 
people  do  not  care  to  wait  any  longer  and  do  not 
trust  the  "masters/'  No  words  are  strong  enough 
to  CQnvince  me  to  the  contrary.  To  back  one's  argu- 
ments with  Japanese  bayonets  and  English  machine 
guns  is  just  as  criminal,  in  my  opinion,  as  to 
assassinate  one's  own  mother.  And  all  the  outcries 
of  the  interventionists — that  this  is  a  "democratic" 
way  of  helping  Russia — are  mere  hypocrisy. 

When  one  and  one-half  years  ago  the  monarchy 
was  overthrown  in  Russia,  I,  as  well  as  many  others, 
believed  that  Russia  could  not  cope  with  the  political 
revolution,  war,  and  the  social  revolution  at  the 
same  time.  It  was  true.  We  were  thrown  out  of 
the  war,  and  for  this  we  had  to  pay  with  the  Brest- 
Litovsk  treaty.  But  we  are  confronted  with  an 
accomplished  fact  and  we  are  powerless  to  turn  back 
the  wheel  of  events.  We  have  lost  the  war,  yet  in 
social  progress  we  have  taken  tremendous  steps 
ahead.  And  now  the  question  is — ^W^hat  are  we 
to  do  ?  Insist  that  the  social  revolution  is  untimely  ? 
Shall  we,  together  with  the  reactionaries  and  Czar- 
ists,  liquidate  all  the  gains  of  the  Revolution  and 
assist  the  French  and  English  in  dividing  Russia 
among  themselves  ?  Or  shall  we,  with  our  opponents 
from  the  Left,  defend  Russia  and  the  Revolution 
from  her  internal  and  foreign  enemies?  As  far  as  I 
am  concerned,  there  can  be  no  question,  and  that  is 
why,  while  remaining  a  Moderate  Socialist,  I  sin- 
cerely and  conscientiously  believe  that  I  must  serve 
Russia  under  the  Soviet  banner. 

There  is  still  another  point  to  be  considered.  We 
may  not  fully  agree  with  the  Soviet  Government; 
we  may  doubt  the  possibility  of  realizing  some  of  its 
ideals,  but  we  can  hardly  deny  the  fact  that  it  is 
consistent  and  clear  in  its  demands.    The  opponents 


40  A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA 

of  the  Soviet  Government  have  no  platform  what- 
soever and  they  cannot  have  any.  They  represent 
the  most  picturesque  conglomerate :  side  by  side  with 
old  Revolutionists  we  see  former  officials  of  the 
Czar's  police;  side  by  side  with  noble  dreamers  we 
see  the  faces  of  criminals;  side  by  side  with  mon- 
archists we  see  anarchists — all  of  them  are  united 
in  their  mad  desire  to  overthrow  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment; and  the  old  English  diplomats,  who  are  oper- 
ating behind  their  backs,  have  finally  realized  that 
such  a  union  is  not  stable  and  that  it  must  be  re- 
placed by  a  whip. 

And  so  the  Siberian  khedive  Kolchak  has  appeared 
on  the  horizon.  He  began  his  political  career  with 
the  arrest  of  the  members  of  the  Constituent  As- 
sembly, with  the  reopening  of  the  vodka  factories, 
and  with  the  reintroduction  of  the  Czar's  rules 
against  Jews.  So  the  question  is  as  follows:  Kol- 
chak, or  the  Soviets  ? — The  dictatorship  of  the  work- 
ing people,  or  the  dictatorship  of  an  insignificant 
group  of  adventurers,  behind  the  backs  of  whom 
there  are  foreigners  ?  The  people,  or  generals  ?  The 
decision  is  clear. 

The  Soviet  Government  has  found  it  difficult  to 
bring  the  economic  life  of  Russia  back  to  normal. 
The  peasants  have  received  the  land,  but  remafn 
without  agricultural  implements,  nails,  and  textile 
goods.  The  workmen  have  obtained  control  over 
production,  but  remain  without  bread  and  without 
coal.  Production  itself  has  slowed  down.  The  most 
important  factor  in  this  situation  is  the  isolation  of 
Russia.  She  is  practically  excluded  from  the  world 
exchange.  She  is  now  like  a  besieged  fortress,  a 
fortress  which  the  enemy  wants  to  take,  if  not  by 
force  of  arms  then  by  hunger.    By  what  right?   For 


A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA  41 

what  ?  It  is  said  that  we  have  committed  two  sins : 
first,  we  do  not  want  to  pay  the  debt  to  France. 
Yes,  in  principle  we  do  not  consider  ourselves  re- 
sponsible for  the  Czar's  loans,  because  part  of  them 
were  expended  for  the  oppression  of  the  Russian 
people.  But  practically  we  do  not  refuse  to  discuss 
this  matter — this  is  quite  clear  from  the  note  of 
Tchitcherin  of  October  26.  Second,  it  is  being  said 
that  we  have  betrayed  the  Allies.  In  my  opinion  the 
Allies  have  betrayed  us  and  are  now  dividing  among 
themselves  the  booty  which  was  promised  to  us. 
But  we  do  not  protest  against  this.  Proclaiming  a 
peace  without  annexations  and  contributions,  Russia 
has  renounced  her  participation  in  the  division  of 
any  booty.  But  having  sacrificed  for  the  Allies 
7,000,000  of  her  sons,  she  is  justified  in  demanding 
that  she  be  left  alone.  But  let  us  assume  for  a  sec- 
ond that  we  are  guilty  of  breaking  a  treaty:  then 
what  about  Italy  who  broke  the  treaty  with  the 
Central  Powers  ?  She  is  being  complimented  on  it ! 
But  we  also  have  a  third  sin,  of  which  people 
do  not  speak  aloud:  we  are  weak,  but  our 
land  is  rich — why  not  make  use  of  it  ?  I  understand 
this  perfectly  well.  Together  with  England  we  par- 
titioned Persia  and  only  a  short  while  ago  we 
dreamed  of  the  partition  of  Austria  and  Turkey. 
And  now  we  are  being  partitioned!  I  understand 
it  all.  I  understand  the  English  and  French  very 
well,  but  I  cannot  understand  the  Americans  at  all. 
We  owe  you  very  little;  we  have  no  treaties  with 
you  and  never  had  any,  and  in  the  division  of  Rus- 
sia you  do  not  intend  to  participate.  Why  then  do 
you  keep  your  soldiers  in  Russia?  The  interests  of 
the  United  States  do  not  conflict  with  the  interests 
of  Russia.     More  than  that,  no  other  country  is 


42  A  VOICE  OUT  OF  RUSSIA 

more  interested  in  the  realization  of  the  ideals  of 
the  freedom  of  the  seas  and  the  League  of  Nations, 
which  your  President  is  faithfully  upholding  in 
Europe,  than  Russia.  All  our  seas  are  not  free.  Our 
Government  is  most  of  all  international.  Moreover 
the  interests  of  exchange  between  Russia  and  America 
at  present  should  be  mutual.  During  the  war  the 
United  States  has  tremendously  developed  her  pro- 
duction, and  she  needs  foreign  markets.  Russia 
could  be  one.  She  needs  goods.  She  cannot  of 
herself  increase  production  and  stimulate  industry. 
Yet  we  have  plenty  to  pay  with:  our  natural  re- 
sources are  enormous.  The  question  of  how  to 
utilize  these  resources  in  order  to  pay  for  your  goods 
may  be  decided  upon  by  mutual  understanding  and 
discussion  either  in  Washington  or  in  Moscow,  but 
surely  this  cannot  be  decided  by  mutual  destruction 
in  the  swamps  of  Archangel.  The  Soviet  Govern- 
ment has  attempted  rnany  a  time  to  begin  such  dis- 
cussions. 

This  argument  is  usually  disposed  of  by  referring 
to  the  Bolshevik  danger.  First  of  all,  the  responsi- 
bility of  power  has  compelled  the  Bolsheviki  to  be- 
come more  moderate.  Second,  the  Soviets  and  the 
Bolsheviki  are  not  one  and  the  same.  The  Bolshe- 
viki at  the  present  time  dominate  the  Soviets — to  a 
great  extent  because  of  the  policy  of  the  Allies.  Yet, 
fearing  Bolshevism,  you  are  cultivating  it.  More 
than  that,  by  your  actions  you  justify  its  ideology. 
As  far  as  the  philosophic  side  of  the  question  is  con- 
cerned, we  differ  from  the  Bolsheviki  in  the  matter 
of  natural  impulses.  The  Bolsheviki  say  that  such 
impulses  are  only  class  interests.  We,  realizing  that 
class  interests  are  the  most  important  interests  of 
mankind,    nevertheless    believe    that    mankind    has 


ORIGINAL  DECREES  43 

Other  interests;  religious,  moral,  national,  and 
esthetic.  At  present  this  point  of  view  is  being 
subjected  to  a  difficult  trial.  There  is  some  ground 
for  your  accusation  that  the  Bolsheviki  are  serving 
the  interests  of  one  class  only.  But  what  about  those 
who  attempt  to  tighten  a  steel  lasso  around  the  neck 
of  Russia,  those  who  forget  that  she  came  to  this 
condition  fighting  with  the  Allies  and  for  the  Allies 
— whom  are  those  interventionists  serving?  The 
class  interests  of  the  propertied  class  or  the  ideal  of 
justice?     Is  it  really  possible  that  these  ideals  are 

^        ^     *  George  V.  Lomonossoff. 


Original  Decrees  of  the  Soviet 
Government 

Decree  on  the  Land 

Of  the  Congress  of  Soviets  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers' 
Delegates  (passed  at  the  meeting  of  October  26,  2  a.m. 
[Russian  style]). 

(1)  All  private  ownership  of  land  is  abolished  immedi- 
ately without  any  indemnification. 

(2)  All  landowners'  estates,  likewise  all  the  lands  of 
the  Crown,  monasteries,  Church  lands,  with  all  their 
live  stock  and  inventoried  property,  homestead  con- 
structions and  all  appurtenances,  pass  over  into  the 
disposition  of  the  Volost  Land  Committees  and  District 
Soviets  of  Peasants'  Delegates  until  the  Constituent 
Assembly  meets. 

(3)  Any  damage  whatever  done  to  the  confiscated  prop- 
erty belonging  from  now  on  to  the  whole  people  is 
regarded  as  a  grievous  crime,  punishable  by  the  Revo- 
lutionary Court  of  Justice.  The  District  Soviets  of 
Peasant  Delegates  shall  take  all  necessary  measures  for 
the  observance  of  the  strictest  order  during  the  con- 
fiscation of  the  landowners'  estates,  for  the  determina- 
tion of  the  dimensions  of  the  plots  of  land  and  which 
of  them  are  subject  to  confiscation,  for  the  drawing  up 


44  ORIGINAL  DECREES 

of  an  inventory  of  the  whole  confiscated  property,  and 
for  the  strictest  Revolutionary  Guard  of  all  the  farming 
property  on  the  land  with  all  the  constructions,  imple- 
n^ents,  cattle,  supplies  of  products,  etc.,  passing  over 
to  the  people. 

(4)  For  guidance  during  the  realization  of  the  great  land 
reforms  until  their  final  resolution  by  the  Constituent 
Assembly  shall  serve  the  following  peasant  Nakaz 
(Instruction)  drawn  up  on  the  basis  of  242  local  peas- 
ant nakazes  by  the  editor's  office  of  the  Izvestia  of  the 
All-Russia  Soviet  of  Peasant  Delegates  and  published 
in  No.  88  of  said  Izvestia  (Petrograd,  No.  88,  August 
19,  1917   [Russian  style]). 

The   question   re   the   land  may  be   decided   only  by  the 

general   Constituent   Assembly. 

The  most  equitable  solution  of  the  land  question  should 

be  as  follows: 

(1)  The  right  of  private  ownership  of  the  land  is  abol- 
ished forever;  the  land  cannot  be  sold,  nor  leased,  nor 
mortgaged,  nor  alienated  in  any  other  way.  All  the 
lands  of  the  State,  the  Crown,  the  Cabinet,  the  monas- 
teries, Churches,  possession  lands,  entailed  estates,  pri- 
vate lands,  public  and  peasant  lands,  etc.,  shall  be 
alienated  without  any  indemnification;  they  become  the 
property  of  the  people  and  the  usufructory  property  of 
all  those  who  cultivate  them  (who  work  them). 

For  those  .who  will  suffer  from  this  revolution  of 
property  the  right  is  recognized  only  to  receive  public 
assistance  during  the  time  necessary  for  them  to  adapt 
themselves  to  the  new  conditions  of  existence. 

(2)  All  the  underground  depths — the  ore,  naphtha,  coal, 
salt,  etc. — and  also  the  forests  and  waters,  having  a 
general  importance,  shall  pass  over  into  the  exclusive 
use  of  the  States.  All  the  minor  rivers,  lakes,  forests, 
etc.,  shall  be  the  usufruct  of  communities,  provided  they 
be  under  the  management  of  the  local  organizations  of 
self-government. 

(3)  The  plots  of  land  with  highest  culture — gardens, 
plantations,  nursery  gardens,  seed-plots,  greenhouses, 
etc. — shall  not  be  divided,  but  they  shall  be  transformed 
into  model  farms  and  handed  over  as  the  exclusive 
usufruct  of  the  State  or  communities,  in  dependence  on 
their   dimensions  or   importance. 

Homestead  lands,  town  and  country  lands  with  pri- 
vate gardens  and  kitchen  gardens,  remain  as  usufruct 
of  their  present  owners.  The  dimensions  of  such  lands 
and  the  rate  or  taxes  to  be  paid  for  their  use  shall  be 
established  by  the  laws. 


ORIGINAL  DECREES  45 

(4)  Studs,  governmental  and  private  cattle-breeding  and 
bird-breeding  enterprises,  etc.,  become  the  property  of 
the  people  and  pass  over  either  for  the  exclusive  use  of 
the  State,  or  a  community,  depending  on  their  dimen- 
sions and  their  importance. 

All  questions  of  redeeming  same  shall  be  submitted 
to  the   examination  of  the   Constituent  Assembly. 

(5)  All  the  agricultural  inventoried  property  of  the 
confiscated  lands,  the  live  and  dead  stock,  pass  over 
into  the  exclusive  use  of  the  State  or  a  community, 
depending  on  their  dimensions  and  importance,  without 
any  indemnification. 

The  confiscation  of  property  shall  not  concern  peas- 
ants who  have  a  small  amount  of  land. 

(6)  The  rights  to  use  the  land  shall  belong  to  all  the 
citizens  (without  distinction  of  sex)  of  the  Russian 
State,  who  wish  to  work  the  land  themselves,  with  the 
help  of  their  families,  or  in  partnerships,  and  only  so 
long  as  they  are  capable  of  working  it  themselves.  No 
hired  labor  is  allowed. 

In  the  event  of  a  temporary  incapacity  of  a  member 
of  a  village  community  during  the  course  of  two  years, 
the  community  shall  be  bound  to  render  him  assistance 
during  this  period  of  time  by  cultivating  his  land. 

Agriculturists  who  in  consequence  of  old  age  or  sick- 
ness shall  have  lost  the  possibility  of  cultivating  their 
land  shall  lose  the  right  to  use  it,  and  they  shall  receive 
instead   a   pension   from  the   State. 

(7)  The  use  of  the  land  shall  be  distributive,  i.  e.,  the 
land  shall  be  distributed  among  the  laborers,  in  de- 
pendence on  the  local  conditions — at  the  labor  or  con- 
sumption rate. 

The  way  in  which  the  land  is  to  be  used  may  be 
freely  selected:  as  homestead,  or  farm,  or  by  communi- 
ties, or  associations,  as  will  be  decided  in  the  separate 
villages  and  settlements. 

(8)  All  the  land,  upon  its  alienation,  is  entered  in*  the 
general  popular  land  fund.  The  local  and  central  self- 
governing  organizations,  beginning  from  the  demo- 
cratically organized  village  and  town  communities  and 
ending  with  the  Central  Province  institutions,  shall  see 
to  the  distribution  of  the  land  among  the  persons  de- 
sirous of  working  it. 

The  land  fund  is  subject  to  periodical  redistributions, 
depending  on  the  increase  of  the  population  and  the 
development  of  the  productivity  and  cultivation. 

Through  all  changes  of  the  limits  of  the  allotments 
the  original  kernel  of  the  allotment  must  remain  intact. 


46  ORIGINAL  DECREES 

The  land  of  any  members  leaving  the  community 
returns  to  the  land  fund,  and  the  preferential  right  to 
receive  the  allotments  of  retiring  members  belongs  to 
their  nearest  relations  or  the  persons  indicated  by 
them. 

The  value  of  the  manuring  and  improvements  in- 
vested in  the  land,  in  so  far  as  the  same  -will  not  have 
been  used  up  when  the  allotment  will  be  returned  to 
the  land  fund,  must  be  reimbursed. 

If  in  some  place  the  land  fund  will  prove  to  be  in- 
sufficient for  the  satisfaction  of  the  local  population, 
the  surplus  of  the  population  must  emigrate. 

The  organization  of  the  emigration,  also  the  costs 
thereof  and  of  providing  the  emigrants  with  the  neces- 
sary stock,  shall  be  borne  by  the  State. 

The  emigration  is  carried  out  in  the  following  order: 
first  the  peasants  without  land  who  express  their  wish 
to  emigrate ;  then  the  depraved  members  of  communi- 
ties, deserters,  etc. ;  and  lastly  by  drawing  lots  on 
agreement. 

All  of  what  is  contained  in  this  Nakaz,  being  the 
expression  of  the  will  of  the  greatest  majority  of  con- 
scious peasants  of  the  whole  of  Russia,  is  pronounced 
to  be  a  temporary  law,  which  till  the  Constituent 
Assembly  is  to  be  put  into  execution  as  far  as  possible 
immediately  and  in  some  parts  of  it  gradually  as  will 
be  determined  by  the  District  Soviets  of  Peasant  Dele- 
gates. 

The  lands  of  peasants  and  Cossacks  serving  in  the 
ranks  shall  not  be  confiscated. 

Chairman     of    the     Council     of 
People's       Commissaries.         Vladi- 
mir Oulianoff-Lenin. 
October  26,  1917.   [Russian  style] 

Decree  on  Workers'  Control 

Decree  of  the  Council  of  People's  Commissaires  estab- 
lishing organs  for  Workers'  Control  of  Industries. 
(1)  In  order  to  put  the  economic  life  of  the  country  on 
an  orderly  basis,  control  by  the  workers  is  instituted 
over  all  industrial,  commercial,  and  agricultural  under- 
takings and  societies ;  and  those  connected  with  bank- 
ing and  transport,  as  well  as  over  productive  cooper- 
ative societies  which  employ  labor  or  put  out  work  to 
be  done  at  home  or  in  connection  with  the  production, 
purchase  and  sale  of  commodities  and  of  raw  materials, 
and  with  conservation  of  such  commodities  as  well  as 
regards  the  financial  aspect  of  such  undertakings. 


ORIGINAL  DECREES  47 

(2)  Control  is  exercised  by  all  the  workers  of  a  given 
enterprise  through  the  medium  of  their  elected  organs, 
such  as  factories  and  works  committees,  councils  of 
workmen's  delegates,  etc.,  such  organs  equally  com- 
prising representatives  of  the  employees  and  of  the 
technical  staff. 

(3)  In  each  important  industrial  town,  province,  or  dis- 
trict, is  set  up  a  local  workmen's  organ  of  control, 
which  being  the  organ  of  the  soldiers',  workmen's  and 
peasants*  council,  will  comprise  the  representatives  of 
the  labor  unions,  workmen's  committees,  and  of  any 
other  factories,  as  well  as  of  workmen's  cooperative 
societies. 

(4)  Until  such  time  as  workmen's  organs  of  control  hold 
a  congress,  the  All-Russian  Workmen's  Council  of  Con- 
trol is  to  be  set  up  in  Petrograd,  on  which  will  sit 
representatives  of  the  following  organizations:  five 
delegates  of  the  E.  C.  (executive  committee)  of  the 
Council  (Soviet)  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  delegates 
of  Russia ;  five  delegates  of  the  E.  C.  of  the  Peasants' 
Council  of  Russia ;  five  delegates  of  the  Labor  Unions 
of  Russia;  two  delegates  of  the  Central  Committee  of 
the  Workingmen's  Cooperative  Societies  of  Russia ; 
five  delegates  of  the  Factory  and  Works  Committee  of 
Russia ;  five  delegates  of  the  Engineers'  and  Technical 
Agents'  Union  of  Russia ;  two  delegates  of  the  Agrarian 
Union  of  Russia ;  one  delegate  from  each  Workmen's 
Union  in  Russia  having  not  less  than  100,000  members, 
two  delegates  from  any  union  having  a  membership 
of  over  100,000;  two  delegates  from  the  E.  C.  of  the 
Labor  Unions. 

(5)  Side  by  side  with  the  Workmen's  Supreme  Council 
of  the  Labor  Unions,  committees  of  inspection  compris- 
ing technical  specialists,  accountants,  etc.  These  com- 
mittees, both  on  their  own  initiative  or  at  the  request 
of  local  workmen's  organs  of  control,  proceed  to  a  given 
locality  to  study  the  financial  and  technical  side  of  any 
enterprise. 

(6)  The  Workmen's  Organs  of  Control  have  the  right  to 
supervise  production,  to  fix  a  minimum  wage  in  any 
undertaking,  and  to  take  steps  to  fix  the  prices  at  which 
manufactured  articles   are  to  be   sold. 

(7)  The  Workmen's  Organs  of  Control  have  the  right 
to  control  all  correspondence  passing  in  connection  with 
the  business  of  an  undertaking  being  held  responsible 
before  a  court  of  justice  for  diverting  their  correspond- 
ence.    Commercial  secrets  are  abolished.     The  owners 

I     are  called  upon  to  produce  to  the  Workmen's  Organs 


48 


ORIGINAL  DECREES 


of  Control  all  books  and  moneys  in  hand,  both  relatij 

to  the  current  year  and  to  any  previous  transactions. 

(8)   The  decisions  of  the  Workmen's  Organs  of  Contj 

are  binding  upon  the  owners  of  undertakings,  and  c^ 

I     '    '    *^"^   '"^^e  hv  the  r'ecision  of  a  Workmel 


•  *'Jc  .        J  -  ..'V  p"    '    :   it  t\°  :'■.  -    ..rs,  or  ».        "^ dn 
vOri>     -;    ,.    I  .; ..  c        to    ?.  :>jai    to    a    \  cne 

Superior    Court  of   Control   agaiiibt   ia^   decisions 
by  any  of  the  lower  organs  of  Workmen's  Controlj 

(10)  In  all  undertakings,  the  owners  and  the  represen 
tives  of  workmen  and  of  employees  delegated  to  ex 
cise  control  on  behalf  of  the  workmen,  are  respons^ 
to  the  Government  for  the  maintenance  of  strict 
and  discipline,  and  for  the  conservation  of  propj 
(goods).  Those  guilty  of  misappropriating  materl 
and  products,  of  not  keeping  books  properly,  and| 
similar    offenses,    are    liable    to    prosecution. 

(11)  Workmen's  District  Councils  of  Control  settle  I 
disputes  and  conflicts  between  the  lower  Organs| 
Control,  as  well  as  all  complaints  made  by  the  owrl 
of  undertakings,  taking  into  consideration  any  pecuj 
conditions  under  which  production  is  carried  on, 
local  conditions.  They  will  issue  instructions  wi| 
the  limits  prescribed  by  the  All-Russian  Workn 
Council  of  Control  and  supervise  the  activities  of| 
lower  organs  of  control. 

(12)  The    All-Russian    Workmen's    Council    of    Cor| 
shall  work  out  a  general  plan  for  control  to  be 
eised  by  the   workmen,   and  to   issue   instructions 
regulations,  and  to  systematize  the  reports  of  the 
ous  Workmen's  Councils  of  Control;  and  constitute 
supreme    authority   for.  dealing   with   all   matters 
nected  with  the  control  exercised  by  workmen. 

(13)  The  All-Russian  Workmen's  Council  of  CoJ 
coordinates  the  activities  of  the  Workmen's  OrgaiT 
Control  and  of  those  institutions  which  direct  the| 
ganization  of  the  economic  life  of  the  country. 
A  regulation  concerning  the  relations  between  the! 

Russian    Workmen's    Council    of    Control    and    the 
institutions  which  organize  and  put  in  order  the  ecod 
life  of  the  country  will  be  issued  later. 

(14)  All  laws  and  circulars  which  impede  the  p| 
working  of  the  factory,  works,  and  other  comma 
and  that  of  workmen's  and  employees'  councilsj 
abrogated. 


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